CAJ | 학술논문

考虑在专利完善市场存在的再制造知识产权保护问题,分析了受专利保护下政府补贴回收再制造的两种机制：补贴给拥有专利的原制造商（GM机制）、直接补贴给第三方再制造商（GT机制）,并建立了由第三方回收再制造的闭环供应链分散决策模型。结果表明,在专利产品再制造需要授权的情况下,两种机制下的产品销售价格、批发价格、旧产品的回收价格及回收量是分别相同的,原制造商可以通过收取专利许可费与第三方再制造商分享再制造和政府补贴所带来的收益。利用收益-费用分享契约,能够实现专利保护与政府补贴下闭环供应链的整体协调。
고필재전리완선시장존재적재제조지식산권보호문제,분석료수전리보호하정부보첩회수재제조적량충궤제：보첩급옹유전리적원제조상（GM궤제）、직접보첩급제삼방재제조상（GT궤제）,병건립료유제삼방회수재제조적폐배공응련분산결책모형。결과표명,재전리산품재제조수요수권적정황하,량충궤제하적산품소수개격、비발개격、구산품적회수개격급회수량시분별상동적,원제조상가이통과수취전리허가비여제삼방재제조상분향재제조화정부보첩소대래적수익。이용수익-비용분향계약,능구실현전리보호여정부보첩하폐배공응련적정체협조。
It has been well acknowledged that the closed-loop supply chain （CLSC） and remanufacturing could reduce the burden on the environment because waste from landfills or used products are diverted and then reused. Meanwhile, it is encouraging that there is an increasing demand for remanufactured products in the market because a firm can obtain enormous social and economic benefits. However, in many cases original equipment manufacturers （OEMs） do not engage in the remanufacturing option after considering remanufacturing cost or other factors, while the third-party remanufacturers are attracted by the remanufacturing margins. However, in the patent perfect market OEMs are protected by patent products and own the exclusive right to remanufacturing. Only after the original manufacturer＇s patent licensing can the third-party manufacturers remanufacture used products. In addition, government subsidies can motivate manufacturers to participate in the recycling of old products. However, the current literature only considers the impact of government incentive mechanisms, but ignores the intellectual property protection of remanufacturing of patented products. Different from previous studies, this paper investigates the patent licensing and government subsidies in the patent perfect market in the condition that OEMs authorize the third-party remanufacturer to remanufacture goods. Firstly, the paper analyzes two different strategies for government to subsidize the remanufacturing of used products under patent protection, OEMs of the patented products （GM mechanism） and the third-party manufacturer （GT mechanism）. In addition, the closed-loop supply chain＇s realized model is established so that OEMs can authorize the third-party remanufacturer to remanufacture used product. The results show that sales price, wholesale price, cost, and amount of used products are the same under the two mechanisms when the patented product remanufacturing requires OEMs＇ authorization. OEMs and the third-party manufacturer share the economic benefits of remanufacturing and government subsidies through licensing fee. Secondly, efficiency is lost in the decentralized closed-loop supply chain. Centralized decision not only improves profits but also benefits consumers. Finally, the revenue and expense- sharing contract （RAESC） including three parties are proposed to coordinate the closed-loop supply chain, which is different from the traditional revenue sharing contract. To summarize, this paper adopts the game theory to study the patents-related closed-loop supply chain mode. Major findings of this study can provide some valuable theoretical and practical implications for OEMs and government to make effective decisions in the closed-loop supply chain operations.