CAJ | 학술논문

本文通过控制项目自然状态来模拟私有信息环境，通过控制投融资双方的角色比例来体现谈判力，以此来研究两者对直接融资市场上中小企业融资契约选择偏好的影响。实验结果表明：（1）私有信息对融资方的契约选择有显著影响，当双方谈判力均等且融资方具有项目好（坏）状态的私有信息时，融资方最倾向于选择标准债务（股权）契约；（2）在控制私有信息的前提下，投资方拥有谈判力将会导致选择可转债的融资方比例增大；（3）在融资方具有私有信息且投资方拥有谈判力的前提下，投资方谈判力越大，则融资方私有信息对自身契约选择的影响越小。以上研究为消除我国中小企业直接融资市场的信息不对称所带来的负面影响提供了理论支持。
본문통과공제항목자연상태래모의사유신식배경，통과공제투융자쌍방적각색비례래체현담판력，이차래연구량자대직접융자시장상중소기업융자계약선택편호적영향。실험결과표명：（1）사유신식대융자방적계약선택유현저영향，당쌍방담판력균등차융자방구유항목호（배）상태적사유신식시，융자방최경향우선택표준채무（고권）계약；（2）재공제사유신식적전제하，투자방옹유담판력장회도치선택가전채적융자방비례증대；（3）재융자방구유사유신식차투자방옹유담판력적전제하，투자방담판력월대，칙융자방사유신식대자신계약선택적영향월소。이상연구위소제아국중소기업직접융자시장적신식불대칭소대래적부면영향제공료이론지지。
This paper simulated the private information environment through controlling the project state and reflected bargaining power through controlling the proportion of investors and entrepreneurs, and then studied the impact of private information and bargaining power on small and medium-sized enterprises＇（SME） selection of direct financing contract. The experimental results showed that： First, private information has a significant impact on entrepreneur＇ s contract selection. When the bargaining power of both sides is equal and entrepreneurs get the private information of good （bad） state, they prefer to choose standard debt （equity） contract. Second, controlling the private information, bargaining power will lead to a larger proportion of entrepreneurs selecting convertible bonds. Third, when entrepreneurs have private information but investors have the bargaining power, the greater of investors＇ bargaining power, the smaller impact of entrepreneur＇ s private information on their contract selection. This paper provided a theoretical support for eliminating the negative effect of information asymmetry in China＇ s SME direct financing market.