经济社会体制比较
經濟社會體製比較
경제사회체제비교
Comparative Economic and Social Systems
2013年
5期
100~108
,共null页
自愿性 环境政策工具 管制压力 博弈均衡
自願性 環境政策工具 管製壓力 博弈均衡
자원성 배경정책공구 관제압력 박혁균형
Voluntary Environmental Policy Instruments; Regulation Press; Game
自愿性环境政策工具是企业与管制机构博弈的结果，管制压力是影响该工具制定与效果的关键因素，那么，管制压力是如何影响自愿性工具呢？为了解释管制压力对自愿性环境协议的影响过程，文章建构了一个简单的经济模型，验证管制压力与自愿性协议的关系。研究表明：第一，管制压力是企业决定是否参加自愿性协议的主要因素；第二，自愿性协议中所确定的自愿削减量是管制机构与企业博弈均衡的结果，均衡结果有可能是最优自愿削减量，该削减量大于管制工具所强加的最优削减量，但是最优自愿削减量的产生依赖于强的管制压力。
自願性環境政策工具是企業與管製機構博弈的結果，管製壓力是影響該工具製定與效果的關鍵因素，那麽，管製壓力是如何影響自願性工具呢？為瞭解釋管製壓力對自願性環境協議的影響過程，文章建構瞭一箇簡單的經濟模型，驗證管製壓力與自願性協議的關繫。研究錶明：第一，管製壓力是企業決定是否參加自願性協議的主要因素；第二，自願性協議中所確定的自願削減量是管製機構與企業博弈均衡的結果，均衡結果有可能是最優自願削減量，該削減量大于管製工具所彊加的最優削減量，但是最優自願削減量的產生依賴于彊的管製壓力。
자원성배경정책공구시기업여관제궤구박혁적결과，관제압력시영향해공구제정여효과적관건인소，나요，관제압력시여하영향자원성공구니？위료해석관제압력대자원성배경협의적영향과정，문장건구료일개간단적경제모형，험증관제압력여자원성협의적관계。연구표명：제일，관제압력시기업결정시부삼가자원성협의적주요인소；제이，자원성협의중소학정적자원삭감량시관제궤구여기업박혁균형적결과，균형결과유가능시최우자원삭감량，해삭감량대우관제공구소강가적최우삭감량，단시최우자원삭감량적산생의뢰우강적관제압력。
Voluntary environmental policy tools are the result of the game between enterprises and regulatory agencies. Regulatory pressure is the key factor affecting the tools. This research focuses on how regulatory pres-sure influences the setting and performance of voluntary tools. In order to answer this question, this study constructs a simple economic model to test the relationship between regulation pressure and voluntary agreements. This model presents two conclusions： firstly, pressure coming from the regulatory agency is the most important factor in enterprises deciding whether to sign voluntary agreements ; second, pollution reduction targets in volun- tary agreements are the resuh of game equilibrium. The equilibrium result may be the optimum voluntary reduc- tion and greater than reductions imposed by regulation tools, but optimal voluntary reduction relies on strong regulatory pressure.
