CAJ | 학술논문

中立政府在选择经济制度时追求经济增长和政治稳定的双重目标，利益集团为了增加在社会总产出中的份额凭借经济权力和政治权力影响政府的选择。通过分析由政府和两个利益集团构成的博弈模型可以证明：经济制度的变革是政治权力、经济权力、变革成本复杂组合的结果，因而无法保证每一次制度变迁的效率。通过数值模拟多期制度变迁过程可以证明：短期内有效率的制度变革在长期来看也可能是无效率的。为了保证经济活动的长期效率，需要根据财富分配状况及时调整经济制度，这就要求减少政治权力与经济资源的相关性，增加不同备选制度之间的连续性。文章还概略模拟了我国改革开放以来的经济制度变迁过程并进行了外推预测，提出了相关的建议。
중립정부재선택경제제도시추구경제증장화정치은정적쌍중목표，이익집단위료증가재사회총산출중적빈액빙차경제권력화정치권력영향정부적선택。통과분석유정부화량개이익집단구성적박혁모형가이증명：경제제도적변혁시정치권력、경제권력、변혁성본복잡조합적결과，인이무법보증매일차제도변천적효솔。통과수치모의다기제도변천과정가이증명：단기내유효솔적제도변혁재장기래간야가능시무효솔적。위료보증경제활동적장기효솔，수요근거재부분배상황급시조정경제제도，저취요구감소정치권력여경제자원적상관성，증가불동비선제도지간적련속성。문장환개략모의료아국개혁개방이래적경제제도변천과정병진행료외추예측，제출료상관적건의。
The neutral government chooses economic institutions to pursue economic growth and political stabili- ty, while interest groups impact the choice of government by virtue of economic power and political power in or- der to increase their own share in the total output of society. An analysis of the game model consisting of the government and two interest groups shows that changes in economic institutions are the result of a combination of political power, economic power, and reform costs, which means the efficiency of each institutional change can- not be guaranteed. A numerical simulation of the multi - phase process of institutional change shows that seem- ingly efficient institutional changes in the short term may not be efficient in the long term. In order to guarantee long - term efficiency of economic activities, timely adjustments to economic institutions must be made accord- ing to the distribution of wealth, which in turn requires less interdependency between political power and eco- nomic resources, and an increase in the continuity between different options. The paper also roughly simulates the process of economic institutional change during China＇s reform and opening up, and gives some suggestions based on the extrapolation.