CAJ | 학술논문

本文构建了基于我国当前情形下政府间纵向税收竞争对税收增长的影响模型，并以分税制改革以来我国省际面板数据为样本进行动态模型分析，研究了我国纵向税收竞争对税收增长的实际影响。理论研究表明，基于中央地方税收分享比例与地方收入获取行为规范程度两方面的政府间纵向税收竞争对税收增长存在影响。动态面板数据模型分析进一步论证了该结论，指出分税制改革后各省份税收分权指标对税收增长的初期影响为正，但正向影响在不断减弱并转变为负向影响。规范性指标从总体来看对税收增长呈现负向影响；分区域来看，中、西部地区规范性指标对税收增长主要呈现负向影响，而东部地区则主要呈现正向影响。基于此，本文得出结论认为，我国政府间纵向税收竞争程度变动对税收增长呈现正向影响，即提高纵向税收竞争程度将加速税收增长，降低纵向税收竞争程度将减缓税收增长。
본문구건료기우아국당전정형하정부간종향세수경쟁대세수증장적영향모형，병이분세제개혁이래아국성제면판수거위양본진행동태모형분석，연구료아국종향세수경쟁대세수증장적실제영향。이론연구표명，기우중앙지방세수분향비례여지방수입획취행위규범정도량방면적정부간종향세수경쟁대세수증장존재영향。동태면판수거모형분석진일보론증료해결론，지출분세제개혁후각성빈세수분권지표대세수증장적초기영향위정，단정향영향재불단감약병전변위부향영향。규범성지표종총체래간대세수증장정현부향영향；분구역래간，중、서부지구규범성지표대세수증장주요정현부향영향，이동부지구칙주요정현정향영향。기우차，본문득출결론인위，아국정부간종향세수경쟁정도변동대세수증장정현정향영향，즉제고종향세수경쟁정도장가속세수증장，강저종향세수경쟁정도장감완세수증장。
Before 1994, the local government of China possessed a large number of financial resources while the central government only occupied a little. Under this background, the central government of China started to implement the Tax-share Reform. This reform readjusted the financial and administrative power relations between the central and local government. Undoubtedly, the decrease in the government revenue exerted an effect on the behavior of local government which began to focus on the extra-budgetary and extra-institutional revenue. Mean- while, for the sake of restraining these phenomena, the central government carried out a series of rules and regula- tions. This gradually resulted in the intensification of vertical tax competition between the central and local govern- ment. What＇ s more, it is obvious that China has experienced the stage of continuous rapid growth in the tax reve- nue since the Tax-share Reform in 1994. This paper attempts to find out whether the degree of intergovernmental vertical tax competition will influence the tax growth. If so, what the current condition is in China. Based on the current situation in China, this paper establishes a model and introduces the equilibrium analysis method so as to analyze the impact of intergovernmental vertical tax competition on the tax growth. According to the study of Edwards ＆ Keen （1996） and Keen ＆ Kotsogiannis （2002）, this paper introduces a quasi-linear utility function to describe the utility of the representative consumer. In order to simplify the analysis, the paper sets a hy- pothesis that there is only one local government in the economic entity. It is demonstrated that the impact of interg- overnmental vertical tax competition on the tax growth exists from the perspective of the tax-sharing proportion and the constraint degree of the local government behavior in pursuing the revenue. The impact can be divided into two parts： one is the effect of the tax-sharing proportion and the constraint degree on the tax growth respectively; the other one is the effect of the tax-sharing proportion and the constraint degree on the tax growth reciprocally. The size of the impact depends on the ratio of local government revenue and the proportion of rent pursued from the ju- risdiction by the local government. Additionally, this paper employs the provincial dynamic panel data of China from 1994 to 2010 to illustrate what the real impact certified in the model is in China. The tax decentralization index and the constraint index are introduced into the description of the degree of intergovemmental vertical tax competition in China. The empirical study denotes that vertical tax competition exerts a positive influence upon tax growth. In the view of tax decentrali- zation index, there is a positive influence upon the tax growth in each province in the preliminary stage. While, this influence gradually weakens. As a consequence, it turns into the negative one throughout the country. When it comes to the constraint index, it exerts a negative effect on the tax growth overall. Besides, the constraint index im- poses a negative effect on the tax growth in central and western regions, while a positive effect in eastern regions. In conclusion, the change in the degree of intergovernmental vertical tax competition in China imposes a positive im- pact on the tax growth, namely the increase in the degree of vertical tax competition will accelerate the tax growth; and, the decrease in the degree of vertical tax competition will decelerate the tax growth. On the basis of the conclusions, it is indispensable to control the degree of intergovernmental vertical tax com- petition into a reasonable range. It is of significance to promote a rational growth of the taxation. Meanwhile, the government should center on cultivating the main body of local taxation, authorizing the legislative power to the lo- cal government, and optimizing the intergovernmental transfer payment system.