国际金融研究
國際金融研究
국제금융연구
Studies of International Finance
2013年
10期
74~85
,共null页
投资支出 股票收益 负债比例 自由现金流
投資支齣 股票收益 負債比例 自由現金流
투자지출 고표수익 부채비례 자유현금류
Investment Spending; Stock Returns; Debt Ratio; Free Cash Flow
本文建立了投资支出与股票收益关系的模型。实证研究发现,在我国企业中投资支出与股票收益之间存在着负向关系。而且当样本公司处于国有控股期间时.这种负向关系比较显著;当公司控制权转移后,这种负向关系的显著性相对下降。同时,本文还发现.其负向关系显著性下降的原因在于国有控股公司控制权转移前后现金流量比例和负债比例在公司治理效率发挥作用的不同。本文的研究证实了我国国有控股公司控制权的转让是卓有成效的.同时也说明了国有控股公司控制权转移后投资绩效提高的原因.即公司控制权转移通过改善公司治理效率降低了代理成本。本文从新的视角为国有控股公司控制权转移对绩效的影响提供了重要证据。
本文建立瞭投資支齣與股票收益關繫的模型。實證研究髮現,在我國企業中投資支齣與股票收益之間存在著負嚮關繫。而且噹樣本公司處于國有控股期間時.這種負嚮關繫比較顯著;噹公司控製權轉移後,這種負嚮關繫的顯著性相對下降。同時,本文還髮現.其負嚮關繫顯著性下降的原因在于國有控股公司控製權轉移前後現金流量比例和負債比例在公司治理效率髮揮作用的不同。本文的研究證實瞭我國國有控股公司控製權的轉讓是卓有成效的.同時也說明瞭國有控股公司控製權轉移後投資績效提高的原因.即公司控製權轉移通過改善公司治理效率降低瞭代理成本。本文從新的視角為國有控股公司控製權轉移對績效的影響提供瞭重要證據。
본문건립료투자지출여고표수익관계적모형。실증연구발현,재아국기업중투자지출여고표수익지간존재착부향관계。이차당양본공사처우국유공고기간시.저충부향관계비교현저;당공사공제권전이후,저충부향관계적현저성상대하강。동시,본문환발현.기부향관계현저성하강적원인재우국유공고공사공제권전이전후현금류량비례화부채비례재공사치리효솔발휘작용적불동。본문적연구증실료아국국유공고공사공제권적전양시탁유성효적.동시야설명료국유공고공사공제권전이후투자적효제고적원인.즉공사공제권전이통과개선공사치리효솔강저료대리성본。본문종신적시각위국유공고공사공제권전이대적효적영향제공료중요증거。
This paper established a model of the relationship between investment spending and stock returns, empirical research found that there is a negative relationship between investment expenditures and stock returns in China's enterprises. When the sample is in the state-owned holding period, this negative relationship is significant, when the transfer of control of the company, this negative relationship significant relative decline. At the same time, the paper also found a significant nega- tive relationship decreased because different cash flow ratio and debt ratio before and after the state-owned holding compa- nies which control is transferred to play a role in the efficiency of corporate governance. This study confirmed the privatization of state-owned enterprises in China is highly effective, but also improve the investment performance of state-owned holding companies which control is transferred, the transfer of control of the company by improving the efficiency of corporate gover- nance reduces agency costs. In this paper, a new perspective for the transfer of state-owned holding company control over performance provides important evidence.