CAJ | 학술논문

文章通过选取我国九个劳动密集型行业，分析了上市公司管理层自愿披露劳动力成本上涨风险信息的动机和经济后果。结果表明：（1）业绩较差、董事长和总经理两职分离的民营上市公司管理层更愿意主动披露劳动力成本上涨风险信息，表明民营企业管理层可能通过自愿披露劳动力成本上涨风险信息来“解释”较差的业绩以满足考核要求；（2）自愿披露劳动力成本上涨风险的民营上市公司管理层薪酬较高，表明管理层通过自愿信息披露来获得较高的报酬；（3）管理层自愿披露劳动力成本上涨风险信息会降低公司市场价值，而且在国有企业与民营企业之间不存在显著差异，这说明劳动力成本上涨风险信息对于投资者的估值决策具有重要意义，而且投资者无法识别民营企业管理层的选择性信息披露行为。
문장통과선취아국구개노동밀집형행업，분석료상시공사관리층자원피로노동력성본상창풍험신식적동궤화경제후과。결과표명：（1）업적교차、동사장화총경리량직분리적민영상시공사관리층경원의주동피로노동력성본상창풍험신식，표명민영기업관리층가능통과자원피로노동력성본상창풍험신식래“해석”교차적업적이만족고핵요구；（2）자원피로노동력성본상창풍험적민영상시공사관리층신수교고，표명관리층통과자원신식피로래획득교고적보수；（3）관리층자원피로노동력성본상창풍험신식회강저공사시장개치，이차재국유기업여민영기업지간불존재현저차이，저설명노동력성본상창풍험신식대우투자자적고치결책구유중요의의，이차투자자무법식별민영기업관리층적선택성신식피로행위。
Using the sample of listed companies in 9 labor-intensive in- dustries, this paper examines the motive and economic consequences of vol- untary information disclosure of risks of increasing labor costs. It arrives at the conclusions as follows, firstly, the management in private listed compa- nies with worse performance and the separation of positions of chairman and general manager is more likely to voluntarily disclose the information of risks of increasing labor costs, showing that the management in private firms probably provides an explanation of bad performance to meet the needs of performance evaluation by voluntary information disclosure of risks of increasing labor costs; secondly, the management in private listed companies with voluntary information disclosure of risks of increasing labor costs has higher compensation, showing that management gains higher compensation by voluntary information disclosure; thirdly, voluntary information disclosure of risks of increasing labor costs reduces corporate market value, and there is no significant difference between state-owned and private firms, showing that the information of risks of increasing labor costs is of great significance to investors＇ valuation decision-making and investors cannot identify the selective information disclosure of management in private firms.