南京师大学报：社会科学版
南京師大學報：社會科學版
남경사대학보：사회과학판
Journal of Nanjing Normal University (Social Science Edition)
2013年
5期
5~12
,共null页
权力监督 正式规则 非正式规则 利益群体
權力鑑督 正式規則 非正式規則 利益群體
권력감독 정식규칙 비정식규칙 이익군체
power supervision; formal rules; informal rules; vested interest groups
基于路径依赖的微观视角分析，中越两国在权力监督改革方面呈现出三个方面的异同。即，在正式规则方面，两国在改革的深层动力与实践取向上具有共同性，而在宪政制度、国家治理模式、法律规制等方面由于历史传统不同而表现出了差异性；在非正式规则方面，两国改革的共同障碍来源于权力崇拜与服从型政治文化的影响，而意识形态与文化信仰的差异则导致各色监督学说亲疏有别并使得两国权力监督改革表现出不同的变数；既得利益群体在体制变迁惯性推动力方面，其共同性表现为态度认知与风险成本使得内发式监督几无可能，而差异性则表现为由权力红利的积累速度、总量及对社会分配的影响而导致不同的改革难度与压力。从本质上看，中越两国权力监督改革能否成功。关键取决于执政党对改革是否保持有效的控制力。
基于路徑依賴的微觀視角分析，中越兩國在權力鑑督改革方麵呈現齣三箇方麵的異同。即，在正式規則方麵，兩國在改革的深層動力與實踐取嚮上具有共同性，而在憲政製度、國傢治理模式、法律規製等方麵由于歷史傳統不同而錶現齣瞭差異性；在非正式規則方麵，兩國改革的共同障礙來源于權力崇拜與服從型政治文化的影響，而意識形態與文化信仰的差異則導緻各色鑑督學說親疏有彆併使得兩國權力鑑督改革錶現齣不同的變數；既得利益群體在體製變遷慣性推動力方麵，其共同性錶現為態度認知與風險成本使得內髮式鑑督幾無可能，而差異性則錶現為由權力紅利的積纍速度、總量及對社會分配的影響而導緻不同的改革難度與壓力。從本質上看，中越兩國權力鑑督改革能否成功。關鍵取決于執政黨對改革是否保持有效的控製力。
기우로경의뢰적미관시각분석，중월량국재권력감독개혁방면정현출삼개방면적이동。즉，재정식규칙방면，량국재개혁적심층동력여실천취향상구유공동성，이재헌정제도、국가치리모식、법률규제등방면유우역사전통불동이표현출료차이성；재비정식규칙방면，량국개혁적공동장애래원우권력숭배여복종형정치문화적영향，이의식형태여문화신앙적차이칙도치각색감독학설친소유별병사득량국권력감독개혁표현출불동적변수；기득이익군체재체제변천관성추동력방면，기공동성표현위태도인지여풍험성본사득내발식감독궤무가능，이차이성칙표현위유권력홍리적적루속도、총량급대사회분배적영향이도치불동적개혁난도여압력。종본질상간，중월량국권력감독개혁능부성공。관건취결우집정당대개혁시부보지유효적공제력。
Viewed from a micro perspective of path dependence, power supervision reforms in China and Vietnam show both similarities and differences in three aspects. In terms of formal rules, the two countries share the same underlying driving force for reform and the same practice orientation, but show differences in the constitutional system, the mode of governance and legal regulation due to their different histories and traditions. In terms of informal rules, they have the common obstacle to reform which results from the worship of power and the political culture characterized by obedience, but their different ideologies and cultural beliefs make them different in understanding the power supervision re- form both in theory and in practice. Due to the same inertia against reform caused by the invested in- terest groups, it is almost impossible for them to achieve internal supervision because they hold similar attitude toward reform and having the similar cost of risk; but they have different difficulties and pressures in reform due to their differences in the speed and amount of accumulating power-generated profits and in distribution of social resources. In essence, the success of power supervision reforms in China and Vietnam is determined by whether the ruling parties in the two countries can play a ＂locomotive＂ role in the power supervision reform and keep an effective control of the reform process.
