CAJ | 학술논문

非控股股东的权力配置状况较少得到关注，但对了解控股股东的控制方式和解决当前控股股东的利益侵占问题具有重要意义。本文的分析表明．控股股东既有锁定控制权的目标，又面临融资约束、监管舆论等外部环境，因而倾向于把公司各级权力部分地配置给其关系股东。数据分析显示，中国上市公司广泛地存在着控股股东的关系股东。关系股东通过持有大额股份、委派董事、监事或高级管理人员等方式参与公司的决策和管理，其拥有的董事会表决权和高管层话语权显著高于非关系股东，甚至高于其现金流权．获得了超额权力配置。向关系股东配置超额权力隐蔽地提高了控股股东的控制力。本文的发现启示，在股权制衡和公司治理的相关研究中需关注非控股股东的身份与真实权力．在实践和相关法规中需防范关系股东滥用权力或合谋侵占．加强关系股东相关信息的强制披露．引导以机构投资者为代表的中小股东积极参与公司治理，推动公司制改造的市场化。
비공고고동적권력배치상황교소득도관주，단대료해공고고동적공제방식화해결당전공고고동적이익침점문제구유중요의의。본문적분석표명．공고고동기유쇄정공제권적목표，우면림융자약속、감관여론등외부배경，인이경향우파공사각급권력부분지배치급기관계고동。수거분석현시，중국상시공사엄범지존재착공고고동적관계고동。관계고동통과지유대액고빈、위파동사、감사혹고급관리인원등방식삼여공사적결책화관리，기옹유적동사회표결권화고관층화어권현저고우비관계고동，심지고우기현금류권．획득료초액권력배치。향관계고동배치초액권력은폐지제고료공고고동적공제력。본문적발현계시，재고권제형화공사치리적상관연구중수관주비공고고동적신빈여진실권력．재실천화상관법규중수방범관계고동람용권력혹합모침점．가강관계고동상관신식적강제피로．인도이궤구투자자위대표적중소고동적겁삼여공사치리，추동공사제개조적시장화。
Extant literature has paid little attention to the authorities of non-controlling shareholders. But the authority allocation among non-controlling shareholders is important in leaIning how the controlling shareholders control their firms and how to monitor the expropriation behavior of controlling shareholders. This paper documents that controlling shareholders has the goal to maintain their control while facing financial constraint and legislation monitoring, thus they transfer part of the authorities to their related shareholders. Related shareholders widely spread in Chinese listed firms and involve themselves in the decision-making and management teams by holding large stake of shares and appointing directors, supervisors and managers. They obtain significant higher authorities than other non-controlling shareholders and even excessive authorities over their share stakes. The excessive authorities of related shareholders have steahhily and significantly enhanced the controlling power of controlling shareholders. Our findings imply that it is important to identify the identities and real authorities of non-controlling shareholders in the studies of ownership structure and corporate governance. Also, in practice and legislation it is important to prevent the power abusement or collusion of related shareholders, to fully disclose the information about related shareholders, to encourage minority shareholders to actively involve in corporate governance, and to improve the marketization in corporation reform.