哈尔滨商业大学学报：社会科学版
哈爾濱商業大學學報：社會科學版
합이빈상업대학학보：사회과학판
Journal of Harbin University of Commerce:Social Science Edition
2013年
5期
63~68
,共null页
信息系统外包 博弈分析 双向道德风险 信息不对称
信息繫統外包 博弈分析 雙嚮道德風險 信息不對稱
신식계통외포 박혁분석 쌍향도덕풍험 신식불대칭
information systems outsourcing; came dnalysis; aouble -sided moral hazard problem; information asymmetries
信息系统外包可视为存在发包方和承接方双向道德风险问题的非合作博弈安排。通过博弈分析发现，外包契约不应对项目固定费用、失败情形补偿订立单独付款条例，而且根据项目成功溢价分配函数，目标系统越为关键核心。承接方从成功溢价中所获收益越高。此外，就参与方的反应函数特征、以及反应函数变动下的纳什均衡结果进行了讨论。
信息繫統外包可視為存在髮包方和承接方雙嚮道德風險問題的非閤作博弈安排。通過博弈分析髮現，外包契約不應對項目固定費用、失敗情形補償訂立單獨付款條例，而且根據項目成功溢價分配函數，目標繫統越為關鍵覈心。承接方從成功溢價中所穫收益越高。此外，就參與方的反應函數特徵、以及反應函數變動下的納什均衡結果進行瞭討論。
신식계통외포가시위존재발포방화승접방쌍향도덕풍험문제적비합작박혁안배。통과박혁분석발현，외포계약불응대항목고정비용、실패정형보상정립단독부관조례，이차근거항목성공일개분배함수，목표계통월위관건핵심。승접방종성공일개중소획수익월고。차외，취삼여방적반응함수특정、이급반응함수변동하적납십균형결과진행료토론。
Information systems outsourcing arrangements can be treated as a non - cooperative game involving double - sided moral hazard problem between outsourcing firm and outsourcing vendor. Through game analysis, this paper dcmoostrates that outsourcing contracts should not provide sep- arate payment provision for fixed payment and for failure to the outsourcing vendor, and the profit sharing rule of success premium indicates that the more critical and core a target system is to the company then the larger share of the success premium is acquired for the vendor. This paper further discusses the feature of response functions and Nash solutions under the situations that the response functions changed.
