CAJ | 학술논문

古典哲学认为,“先验”与“必然”外延全同.克里普克则指出认知主体可以获得“先验偶然”知识,这一论题甚至在直接指称阵营内部就引起了很大争议.通过澄清“相信的方式（ways of believing）”这一概念,论证严格区分“信态”（state of beliefs）与“模态”（modality）两个层面是解决“先验偶然知识之论争”的关键所在.与之密切相关的是,先验偶然知识合理性论题还可以间接论证专名应具有含义.
고전철학인위,“선험”여“필연”외연전동.극리보극칙지출인지주체가이획득“선험우연”지식,저일론제심지재직접지칭진영내부취인기료흔대쟁의.통과징청“상신적방식（ways of believing）”저일개념,론증엄격구분“신태”（state of beliefs）여“모태”（modality）량개층면시해결“선험우연지식지논쟁”적관건소재.여지밀절상관적시,선험우연지식합이성론제환가이간접론증전명응구유함의.
Traditionally, many synonyms. Yet, Kripke though philosophers considered the terms ＂necessary＂ and ＂a priori＂ to be t that we can separate categories of epistemology＇ from categories of met- aphysics in order to obtain the Contingent A Priori Knowledge. At the first sight, this distinction is closely connected with the direct reference theory. However, there are philosophers and logicians who accept direct reference theory, at the meantime, are suspicious of obtaining the Contingent A Priori Knowledge. This article critically examines various arguments for or against the Contingent A Priori Knowledge. In the light of the notion of ways of believing, it attempts to separate categories of belief states from categories of modality. And it concludes that proper names should have meaning.