CAJ | 학술논문

本文在供应商产品质量摆动的情况下，研究产品有缺陷的二级供应链的质量控制与协调问题，通过建立质量分散合作模式和质量集中决策模式，得出两者在合适的契约条件下可以达到相同效果，并给出了质量契约参数与双方的策略选择和终端质量水平的互动机制。结果显示：供应商的质量惩罚越严厉，制造商承担的顾客损失比重越大，线性转移支付的比例越低，终端产品的质量水平就越好。
본문재공응상산품질량파동적정황하，연구산품유결함적이급공응련적질량공제여협조문제，통과건립질량분산합작모식화질량집중결책모식，득출량자재합괄적계약조건하가이체도상동효과，병급출료질량계약삼수여쌍방적책략선택화종단질량수평적호동궤제。결과현시：공응상적질량징벌월엄려，제조상승담적고객손실비중월대，선성전이지부적비례월저，종단산품적질량수평취월호。
In the condition of product quality oscillation, the paper studies the quality control and coordination of two - echelon supply chain in which the product is defective. By estahlishing the decentralized decision - making model and the centralized decision - making model of quality, this study finds that they can achieve the same effect with the appropriate contract. And then the article analyzes the interaction mechanism between the quality contract parameters with the strategy choice and the terminal quality level. The results show that the more severe punishment the supplier exerts, the more proportion the manufacturer undertakes, and the less linear transfer payment proportion, the higher terminal products quality level.