CAJ | 학술논문

当发生系统性危机时，一国货币当局是选择央行直接救市这种隐性的全额担保制度还是事前建立显性的存款保险制度？一直以来，学术界对央行直接救市存在很大质疑，认为其破坏了市场规则，引发了剧烈的道德风险，并导致一国商业银行内部治理水平较低。改革开放以来，严格的金融管制使得中国面临的金融风险并不严重，因此对存款保险制度的引入仅处于理论探讨阶段。2008年美国次贷危机转化为金融危机，并入侵实体经济之后，银行系统面临的系统性危机才引起中国政府重视。本文从商业银行内部治理水平的视角，通过引入一个商业银行的委托代理模型并增加系统性风险的假设，以探讨隐性全额担保机制与显性存款保险制度的优劣。研究发现：（1）与央行直接救市相比，存款保险制度能够降低央行对商业银行的调控不确定性，且其调控结果可评价；（2）存款保险制度内生化银行提高自身风险的成本，降低了道德风险，即引入存款保险制度后，银行的内部治理水平变高。
당발생계통성위궤시，일국화폐당국시선택앙행직접구시저충은성적전액담보제도환시사전건립현성적존관보험제도？일직이래，학술계대앙행직접구시존재흔대질의，인위기파배료시장규칙，인발료극렬적도덕풍험，병도치일국상업은행내부치리수평교저。개혁개방이래，엄격적금융관제사득중국면림적금융풍험병불엄중，인차대존관보험제도적인입부처우이론탐토계단。2008년미국차대위궤전화위금융위궤，병입침실체경제지후，은행계통면림적계통성위궤재인기중국정부중시。본문종상업은행내부치리수평적시각，통과인입일개상업은행적위탁대리모형병증가계통성풍험적가설，이탐토은성전액담보궤제여현성존관보험제도적우렬。연구발현：（1）여앙행직접구시상비，존관보험제도능구강저앙행대상업은행적조공불학정성，차기조공결과가평개；（2）존관보험제도내생화은행제고자신풍험적성본，강저료도덕풍험，즉인입존관보험제도후，은행적내부치리수평변고。
Being regarded as a market intervention,the bail-out behavior of the central bank after crisis has been criticized for years. It leads to drastic moral hazard situations and is pointed to be the main reason for the internal governance inefficiency in China＇ s commercial banks. However, under strict regulation, previous financial crisis and post-crisis reactions did not draw enough attention and emphasis in China until the financial crisis in 2008. When the banking system encountered a serious systemic crisis,the Deposit Insurance System（DIS） has received significant attention as an important solution. By employing the principal-agent model, this paper provides a comparison, in the perspective of commercial banks＇ internal governance,between an implicit fully secured arrangement and an explicit deposit insurance system. We point out that the DIS has two major advantages over the direct Bail-out system： first, the DIS can reduce the regulatory uncertainty faced by the central bank, and provide a way to evaluate the regulation consequence; second, the DIS can internalize the cost of risk exposure, which reduces the possibility of moral hazard.