CAJ | 학술논문

本文从股东大会剩余控制权和董事会决策控制权两个层次，将家族企业控制权结构分解为金字塔结构和家族超额董事席位实现机制，并以2003--2010年家族上市公司为研究样本，从法律制度效率和金融深化两个维度实证检验家族控制权偏好背后蕴含的策略动机和机会主义行为。结果发现，地区法律制度效率和金融深化显著降低家族控制权结构中的控制权与现金流权分离度和家族董事席位超额控制程度，其影响家族控制权偏好的机理分别是降低控制权私人收益和缓解融资约束。这些结果表明，在转型经济中的家族企业控制权结构是一种对制度蕴含机会的利用和对制度风险规避的机制。
본문종고동대회잉여공제권화동사회결책공제권량개층차，장가족기업공제권결구분해위금자탑결구화가족초액동사석위실현궤제，병이2003--2010년가족상시공사위연구양본，종법률제도효솔화금융심화량개유도실증검험가족공제권편호배후온함적책략동궤화궤회주의행위。결과발현，지구법률제도효솔화금융심화현저강저가족공제권결구중적공제권여현금류권분리도화가족동사석위초액공제정도，기영향가족공제권편호적궤리분별시강저공제권사인수익화완해융자약속。저사결과표명，재전형경제중적가족기업공제권결구시일충대제도온함궤회적이용화대제도풍험규피적궤제。
This paper decomposes family control into pyramidal structure and excess board control. Using a sample of family firms of 2003--2010, we provide empirical evidence on how law efficiency and financial deepening affect family control rights preferences. We find that law efficiency and financial deepening are negatively and significantly associated with the controlling family＇ s （ 1 ） wedge between control rights and cash flow rights and （2） excess board control. Our results show that law efficiency and financial deepening affect family control rights preferences by reducing the family＇ s incentives to gain private benefits of family control and to mitigate financial constraints respectively. The results suggest that the family control structure in the economic transition is a rational response to the economic institutions.