CAJ | 학술논문

面对控股股东攫取私有收益，中小股东往往表现出“理性冷漠”或者选择“用脚投票”卖出股票，而非积极监督。通过建立数理模型首先研究中小股东在约束控股股东自利行为上所起的作用；其次分析影响中小股东参与公司治理决策和监督控股股东意愿的因素，合理解释了现实中存在的中小股东对控股股东自利行为不采取积极监督的原因；最终提出政府相关部门应该从降低维权和监督成本等方面着手，努力营造激励中小股东维权和监督意愿的制度与法律环境的政策建议。
면대공고고동확취사유수익，중소고동왕왕표현출“이성랭막”혹자선택“용각투표”매출고표，이비적겁감독。통과건립수리모형수선연구중소고동재약속공고고동자리행위상소기적작용；기차분석영향중소고동삼여공사치리결책화감독공고고동의원적인소，합리해석료현실중존재적중소고동대공고고동자리행위불채취적겁감독적원인；최종제출정부상관부문응해종강저유권화감독성본등방면착수，노력영조격려중소고동유권화감독의원적제도여법률배경적정책건의。
When controlling stockholders seize their private benefits, minority shareholders tend to be rational apathy or voting with their feet,that is, to sell their stocks, but not conduct active supervision. The paper constructs mathematical models to investigate the role that minority shareholders played on restricting controlling shareholders＇ self - serving action, and then analyzes the factors affecting minority shareholders＇ participation both in corporate governance and monitoring controlling shareholders. At last, the paper interprets the reason why minority shareholders do not conduct supervision actively on controlling shareholders＇ self - serving action. Relevant government authorities should take efforts to reduce the cost in safeguard their rights and interests for minority shareholders, and create a institutional and legal environment which encourages minority shareholders to protect their rights and supervise controlling stockholders＇ self- serving action.