企业经济
企業經濟
기업경제
Enterprise Economy
2013年
10期
54~57
,共null页
过度自信 管理者 过度投资
過度自信 管理者 過度投資
과도자신 관리자 과도투자
overconfidence; managers; overinvestment
我国上市公司存在着过度投资行为，这种过度投资行为的原因解释均是从代理理论进行的。行为金融学认为，管理者的过度自信也会引发过度投资问题。本文从管理者的过度自信角度出发，实证检验了管理者的过度自信会导致企业过度投资的假说在我国上市公司身上是成立的，即使存在融资约束时，过度自信的管理者也会产生过度投资行为。
我國上市公司存在著過度投資行為，這種過度投資行為的原因解釋均是從代理理論進行的。行為金融學認為，管理者的過度自信也會引髮過度投資問題。本文從管理者的過度自信角度齣髮，實證檢驗瞭管理者的過度自信會導緻企業過度投資的假說在我國上市公司身上是成立的，即使存在融資約束時，過度自信的管理者也會產生過度投資行為。
아국상시공사존재착과도투자행위，저충과도투자행위적원인해석균시종대리이론진행적。행위금융학인위，관리자적과도자신야회인발과도투자문제。본문종관리자적과도자신각도출발，실증검험료관리자적과도자신회도치기업과도투자적가설재아국상시공사신상시성립적，즉사존재융자약속시，과도자신적관리자야회산생과도투자행위。
There is evidence that Chinese listed companies invest excessively what it is really needed. Some literatures believe that this overinvestment behavior is due to the agency problem. However, the behavior finance does not agree this kind of explanation. It argues that the managerial overconfidence may also trigger overinvestment. Enlightened by the behavior finance theory, this paper would empirically study the relationship between managers＇ overconfidence and corporate overinvestment in listed companies. The conclusion illustrates that managerial overconfidence may cause the overinvestment problem which also exists in Chinese listed companies. Overconfident managers prefer cash -flow and debt to satisfy the demand of investing, even if there is a financing constraint.
