CAJ | 학술논문

本文在代理理论框架下,对税收征管、税收激进与股价崩盘风险三者之间的关系进行了探讨.通过对我国A股上市公司2003-2010年相关数据的检验发现：（1）税收征管有助于降低企业的税收激进程度；（2）经理人容易利用复杂的避税手段掩盖其利益侵占行为,避税行为越激进,股价未来的崩盘风险越大；（3）税收征管通过改善公司治理,能有效降低股价未来大幅下跌的风险；（4）税收征管有助于约束经理人在税收激进活动中的机会主义行为,随着税收征管强度的提高,税收激进程度与股价崩盘风险的正相关关系减弱.本文的研究对于加深税收征管治理作用的认识,以及如何降低股价崩盘风险、促进股市平稳发展具有重要的理论和现实意义.
본문재대리이론광가하,대세수정관、세수격진여고개붕반풍험삼자지간적관계진행료탐토.통과대아국A고상시공사2003-2010년상관수거적검험발현：（1）세수정관유조우강저기업적세수격진정도；（2）경리인용역이용복잡적피세수단엄개기이익침점행위,피세행위월격진,고개미래적붕반풍험월대；（3）세수정관통과개선공사치리,능유효강저고개미래대폭하질적풍험；（4）세수정관유조우약속경리인재세수격진활동중적궤회주의행위,수착세수정관강도적제고,세수격진정도여고개붕반풍험적정상관관계감약.본문적연구대우가심세수정관치리작용적인식,이급여하강저고개붕반풍험、촉진고시평은발전구유중요적이론화현실의의.
In an agency theory framework, we discuss the relation- ship among tax enforcement, tax aggressiveness and stock price crash risk. Based on this idea we develop three key hypotheses about：（1） how the government＇s efficiency of tax enforcement in- fluences the tax avoidance behavior of individual firms; （2） what is the relationship between tax aggressiveness and future stock price crash risk, tax enforcement and future stock price crash risk, respectively; （3） whether the effect of corporate tax aggressiveness on stock price crash risk will be affected by the tax enforcement efficiency. We test the above hypotheses base on a sample of Shanghai and Shenzhen A share listed firms in China during the period of 2003 to 2010. Firstly, we provide strong evidence that tax enforcement can limit the aggressive of corporate tax avoidance. We argue that this effect is due to the positive relation between tax enforcement and cost of tax avoidance. Secondly, we find that tax aggressiveness of individual firm is positively associated with its future stock price crash risk. This result is consistent with Kim et al. （2011）. It indicates that tax avoidance activities facilitate managerial rent diversion and bad news hoarding behaviors for an extended pe- riod, which increases the probability of future stock price crashes. Thirdly, our result shows that the improvement of tax enforcement will reduce the future stock price crash risk. It indicates that tax enforcement plays an important role of monitor, and reduces the agency tension between shareholders and managers. At last, our results indicate that tax enforcement can restrain the rent diversion of managements during corporate tax avoidance, so the impact of tax aggressiveness on crash risk is less pronounced in the areas with higher tax enforcement. The above results are still hold to different kinds of robustness checks. This paper not only contributes to the literature about the corporate governance effect of tax enforcement, the determinant of stock price crash risk and corporate tax aggres- siveness, but also has important implications for our understanding for the protection of investors and the development of capital market in China.