工业工程
工業工程
공업공정
Industrial Engineering Journal
2013年
5期
45~52
,共null页
闭环供应链 回收模式 协调定价 博弈论
閉環供應鏈 迴收模式 協調定價 博弈論
폐배공응련 회수모식 협조정개 박혁론
closed-loop supply chain; recycling mode; pricing coordination; game theory
在产品通过混合渠道销售和回收的情形下,以博弈论为研究方法,分别建立了集中式和分散式决策3种混合回收模式下闭环供应链的定价模型,求得闭环供应链中各成员的最优定价策略,对3种回收模式的优劣进行比较,并运用2部定价契约探讨了不同回收模式下闭环供应链的协调问题。最后利用算例验证所得结论,分析了渠道间存在竞争对闭环供应链利润的影响。结果表明:存在一个回收价格差敏感度的临界值,当消费者对回收价的敏感度大于此临界值时,制造商参与回收的2种模式是最好的选择;否则,委托零售商和第三方混合回收。二部定价契约可实现分散决策下闭环供应链的协调。渠道间竞争加剧对制造商和整个闭环供应链系统是有益的,但其不是越剧烈越好。
在產品通過混閤渠道銷售和迴收的情形下,以博弈論為研究方法,分彆建立瞭集中式和分散式決策3種混閤迴收模式下閉環供應鏈的定價模型,求得閉環供應鏈中各成員的最優定價策略,對3種迴收模式的優劣進行比較,併運用2部定價契約探討瞭不同迴收模式下閉環供應鏈的協調問題。最後利用算例驗證所得結論,分析瞭渠道間存在競爭對閉環供應鏈利潤的影響。結果錶明:存在一箇迴收價格差敏感度的臨界值,噹消費者對迴收價的敏感度大于此臨界值時,製造商參與迴收的2種模式是最好的選擇;否則,委託零售商和第三方混閤迴收。二部定價契約可實現分散決策下閉環供應鏈的協調。渠道間競爭加劇對製造商和整箇閉環供應鏈繫統是有益的,但其不是越劇烈越好。
재산품통과혼합거도소수화회수적정형하,이박혁론위연구방법,분별건립료집중식화분산식결책3충혼합회수모식하폐배공응련적정개모형,구득폐배공응련중각성원적최우정개책략,대3충회수모식적우렬진행비교,병운용2부정개계약탐토료불동회수모식하폐배공응련적협조문제。최후이용산례험증소득결론,분석료거도간존재경쟁대폐배공응련리윤적영향。결과표명:존재일개회수개격차민감도적림계치,당소비자대회수개적민감도대우차림계치시,제조상삼여회수적2충모식시최호적선택;부칙,위탁령수상화제삼방혼합회수。이부정개계약가실현분산결책하폐배공응련적협조。거도간경쟁가극대제조상화정개폐배공응련계통시유익적,단기불시월극렬월호。
A closed-loop supply chain with selling and recycling through hybrid channels is discussed in this paper. For such a supply chain, there are three hybrid used product recollecting modes : 1 ) recollec- tion by both manufacturers and retailers; 2) recollection by both manufacturers and a third party; and 3 ) recollection by both retailers and a third party. Game theoretic models for pricing decision are developed for different recollecting modes under centralized and decentralized decision-making, respectively. With these models, the advantage and disadvantage of different recycling modes are analyzed. Then, the closed-loop supply chain coordination problems with different recycling modes are discussed by using a two-part pricing contract. An example is given to show the influence of different modes on the supply chain profit. Result shows that there is a recycling price differential sensitivity threshold, and Modes 1 ) and 2) are the best choice when the sensitivity of recycling price is greater than the critical value. Otherwise, Mode 3 ) is the entrusted one. Also, chain coordination in dispersion decisions can be realized by two-part pricing contract.