CAJ | 학술논문

如何建立与公司价值相挂钩的CEO薪酬契约、提高CEO薪酬业绩敏感性从而缓解委托代理问题是公司金融领域的基础课题之一。本文从市场微观结构的角度，研究我国上市公司股票流动性对CEO薪酬激励的影响，发现股票流动性有助于提高CEO薪酬股价敏感性并降低代理成本，而且流动性对CEO薪酬股价敏感性的影响取决于股价信息含量和公司产权性质。本文的研究结果表明，上市公司可以通过提高股票流动性，引导投资者深入挖掘公司层面的特质信息，促使股价信息含量上升，在此基础上向CEO提供高强度的业绩型薪酬并增加股权报酬的比重，将监督经营者的任务委托广大投资者，最终设计出更为合理有效的市场化薪酬契约。
여하건립여공사개치상괘구적CEO신수계약、제고CEO신수업적민감성종이완해위탁대리문제시공사금융영역적기출과제지일。본문종시장미관결구적각도，연구아국상시공사고표류동성대CEO신수격려적영향，발현고표류동성유조우제고CEO신수고개민감성병강저대리성본，이차류동성대CEO신수고개민감성적영향취결우고개신식함량화공사산권성질。본문적연구결과표명，상시공사가이통과제고고표류동성，인도투자자심입알굴공사층면적특질신식，촉사고개신식함량상승，재차기출상향CEO제공고강도적업적형신수병증가고권보수적비중，장감독경영자적임무위탁엄대투자자，최종설계출경위합리유효적시장화신수계약。
Reducing principal-agent problem is an important research question in corporate finance. Prior studies have shown that designing proper CEO incentive contracts and increasing CEO pay-performance sensitivity （PPS） will help mitigate principal-agent problem. This article provides a new perspective based on market microstructure theory and evidence. Using data from publicly listed firms in China, this paper finds that stock liquidity increases PPS and that the information content of stock prices plays a key role in determining this relationship. In addition, the effect of liquidity on PPS is weaker among state-own firms. Further analysis indicates that the PPS induced by stock liquidity significantly reduces agency cost. The findings of this paper imply that to design proper market-based CEO incentives, firms can work on enhancing their stock liquidity. If shares become more liquid, investors will be willing to spend time and resources to gather firm-specific information, which leads to increases in the information content of share prices. As a result, firms can provide high-power CEO incentives by increasing the weight of stock options in CEO compensation, thus delegate the monitoring of CEO performance to investors in the market and lower agency cost.