CAJ | 학술논문

财政分权体制下的地方政府支出竞争行为已成为我国学界关注的热点。当前中国正处在由追求简单经济增长向追求社会民生转变的阶段，提供教育公共服务则是保障社会民生的重要方面。本文研究了我国地市级地方政府可能存在的教育支出相互竞争行为。在理论部分本文提出一个简单的、中国式的“自上而下”标尺竞争模型来解释地市级政府之间教育支出的相互影响机制：上级政府通过比较教育支出来评价地市级政府的相对教育政绩甚至决定地方官员是否连任，从而引发了地市级政府之间的标尺竞争。在文章实证部分使用2007年至2010年312个地级市教育支出等数据构建空间面板数据模型，并在固定效应框架下运用GS2SLS和MLE方法实证估计了地市级地方政府教育支出反应方程。实证结果符合理论模型的预期：地市级政府在教育支出上确实存在标尺竞争，经济距离相近地区之间出于标尺竞争的模仿激励要高于地理相邻地区。此外本文还发现，以财政自主度衡量的财政分权显著地减少了地方政府的公共教育供给。
재정분권체제하적지방정부지출경쟁행위이성위아국학계관주적열점。당전중국정처재유추구간단경제증장향추구사회민생전변적계단，제공교육공공복무칙시보장사회민생적중요방면。본문연구료아국지시급지방정부가능존재적교육지출상호경쟁행위。재이론부분본문제출일개간단적、중국식적“자상이하”표척경쟁모형래해석지시급정부지간교육지출적상호영향궤제：상급정부통과비교교육지출래평개지시급정부적상대교육정적심지결정지방관원시부련임，종이인발료지시급정부지간적표척경쟁。재문장실증부분사용2007년지2010년312개지급시교육지출등수거구건공간면판수거모형，병재고정효응광가하운용GS2SLS화MLE방법실증고계료지시급지방정부교육지출반응방정。실증결과부합이론모형적예기：지시급정부재교육지출상학실존재표척경쟁，경제거리상근지구지간출우표척경쟁적모방격려요고우지리상린지구。차외본문환발현，이재정자주도형량적재정분권현저지감소료지방정부적공공교육공급。
This paper focuses on the local city government＇s （ local city is an administration level just below provincial level） behavior on the education input. We mainly explore whether or not the interaction exists on education expenditure among local governments within the same province. In theoretical part of this paper, we give a simple theoretical mode/of Chinese- Style yardstick competition ＂from the top＂ to explain why there may exist the interactions among local governments over the education expenditure. Based on this theoretical model, this paper further uses the education expenditure data of 312 local cities in China from 2007 to 2010 to construct a spatial panel data model. And we apply GS2SLS and MLE methods under the fixed-effects framework to estimate the parameter of the reaction equation for education expenditure. The empirical results are consistent with our theoretical prediction; that is, there actually exists a yardstick competition among local city level governments over the education expenditure. The interesting thing is that interaction among the neighbors defined by similar economic background is more significant than that among the geographical neighbors. In addition, we find that, for the local city level governments, the more of fiscal decentralization （ measured by fiscal autonomy index） , the less of incentive for more input in public education.