CAJ | 학술논문

文章采用全国省级党政首长的官员数据，对地方官员的财政支出行为及其特征和机制进行了尝试性的识别与分析。研究发现，在“任命制”之下，地方官员的个人特征显著影响了地方政府的财政支出模式：地方财政支出的扩张偏向随着地方官员的任期增加而呈现下降趋势；地方官员学历差异导致显著的财政支出结构差异，高学历的官员倾向于降低建设性支出比重而提高科教文卫支出比重。文章基于地方官员微观主体提出了一个考察地方财政支出的新视角，有望为破解公共品供给难题提供新的解决思路。
문장채용전국성급당정수장적관원수거，대지방관원적재정지출행위급기특정화궤제진행료상시성적식별여분석。연구발현，재“임명제”지하，지방관원적개인특정현저영향료지방정부적재정지출모식：지방재정지출적확장편향수착지방관원적임기증가이정현하강추세；지방관원학력차이도치현저적재정지출결구차이，고학력적관원경향우강저건설성지출비중이제고과교문위지출비중。문장기우지방관원미관주체제출료일개고찰지방재정지출적신시각，유망위파해공공품공급난제제공신적해결사로。
Using data concerning provincial Party secretaries and governors, this paper studies local officials＇ fis- cal spending behavior characteristics and mechanism. We find that under the appointment system, local officials＇ personal characteristics significantly affect the local government＇s fiscal spending patterns; the expan- sion of local fiscal expenditure tend to decrease as the term of local officials increase ; local officials educational differences lead to significant differences in the fiscal expenditure structure - highly educated officials tend to re- duce the proportion of expenditure on construction, and tend to increase the proportion of expenditures related to science and education. These findings present a new perspective of local fiscal expenditure.