CAJ | 학술논문

构建一个完全信息的两阶段动态博弈模型，并假设开源创新项目的领导者通过选择不同的开源授权协议来影响开源社区和开源厂商的参与激励，从而使开源创新活动尽可能得到所有参与者最大限度的支持。结论显示，在单个厂商参与的情况下，开源项目的领导者会根据不同的开源商业模式，来调整开源创新开放性的严格程度，以此最大化整体的激励效果。然而，随着参与厂商的增多，开源授权协议将倾向于采用“严格开放授权”。总体来看，商业参与不会影响开源创新的开放性，甚至有可能会起到强化的作用。
구건일개완전신식적량계단동태박혁모형，병가설개원창신항목적령도자통과선택불동적개원수권협의래영향개원사구화개원엄상적삼여격려，종이사개원창신활동진가능득도소유삼여자최대한도적지지。결론현시，재단개엄상삼여적정황하，개원항목적령도자회근거불동적개원상업모식，래조정개원창신개방성적엄격정도，이차최대화정체적격려효과。연이，수착삼여엄상적증다，개원수권협의장경향우채용“엄격개방수권”。총체래간，상업삼여불회영향개원창신적개방성，심지유가능회기도강화적작용。
This paper attempts to study the influence of business involvement on open source inno- vation from the perspective of licensing scheme. In a two-stage dynamic game with complete informa- tion, the licensor of an open source project tries to manipulate incentives of community and firm by choosing different license agreements so as to maximize total contribution to open source project. The results indicate that openness of open source innovation is influenced by firm＇s complementary bene- fits from contributing to open source project when only one firm is involved; however, restrictive li- cense is preferred when more firms choose to participate. Overall, openness of open source innovation will not be undermined by business involvement and may be enhanced.