CAJ | 학술논문

在风险投资关系中,风险企业家的努力程度关系到风险项目的成功,关系到风险资本收益的安全.本文认为风险企业家的努力可以分为两种：短期努力和持续性努力.风险企业家偏好短期努力,风险投资公司偏好持续性努力.考虑到持续性努力涉及到多个时期,本文建立了基于多时期的委托-代理模型,采用理论模型分析和数值模拟相结合的研究方法,其研究结果表明：如果风险投资公司对风险企业家的长期行为实施成本补偿激励,那么风险企业家付出的持续性努力和短期性努力都比较大,双方会注入更多的资本,风险企业家所持股比例较高,风险投资公司也获得更多的期望利润.同时,风险投资公司要使风险企业家感到未来收益的重要性,如果风险企业家越重视未来的收益,那么对双方的投资量、企业家的努力程度、风险投资公司的期望利润都有正的影响.
재풍험투자관계중,풍험기업가적노력정도관계도풍험항목적성공,관계도풍험자본수익적안전.본문인위풍험기업가적노력가이분위량충：단기노력화지속성노력.풍험기업가편호단기노력,풍험투자공사편호지속성노력.고필도지속성노력섭급도다개시기,본문건립료기우다시기적위탁-대리모형,채용이론모형분석화수치모의상결합적연구방법,기연구결과표명：여과풍험투자공사대풍험기업가적장기행위실시성본보상격려,나요풍험기업가부출적지속성노력화단기성노력도비교대,쌍방회주입경다적자본,풍험기업가소지고비례교고,풍험투자공사야획득경다적기망리윤.동시,풍험투자공사요사풍험기업가감도미래수익적중요성,여과풍험기업가월중시미래적수익,나요대쌍방적투자량、기업가적노력정도、풍험투자공사적기망리윤도유정적영향.
Venture capital companies play a major role in financing start-ups, which often has difficulty obtaining funds through banks or the general public. So, the venture capitalist has the potential to be a source of economic wealth creation. However, the relation between the venture capitalist and his or her portfolio firms may be beset by agency problems, In the light of these problems, the structure of the financial contract becomes very important. In practice, if venture capital companies and venture entrepreneurs established investor relations, the key question is how to motivate the efforts of the risks entrepreneurs. Because venture entrepreneur ＇ s efforts related to the venture project＇s success, and related to the safety of venture capital profit. This paper thinks that venture entrepreneur＇s efforts may be divided into two types： short-term efforts and persistent effort. Short- term efforts only affect the company＇s recent performance; persistent efforts will affect the company＇s long-term performance. Venture entrepreneur prefer short-term effort, however, venture investment firms prefer persistent effort. Taking into account the long-term effort involving multiple periods, in this paper, principal - agent model was modeled based on multi-period, different incentive contracts are set up in the different period of time （ in this paper, we studied only two periods）, the focus is to motivate risk entrepreneurs pay more persistent effort. We use research methods with theoretical analysis and numerical simulation, the research results show that： if the venture investment company commensally incentive to venture entrepreneur＇s persistent efforts, this incentive mechanism is to share the cost of the persistent efforts, then persistent efforts and short-term efforts paid by venture entrepreneur all were larger, the two players will inject more capital to venture project, entrepreneurs hold a higher proportion, namely, risk entrepreneurs have more shares of the company than it of venture capitalists, venture investment firms also got more expected profit. Meanwhile, if venture capital firms make risk entrepreneurs to feel the importance of future earnings, venture entrepreneurs will pay more attention to future earnings （the higher the discount factor） , then there is a positive impact on the two players＇ investment amount, venture entrepreneur＇s efforts degree, and venture investment firms＇ profits.