CAJ | 학술논문

创业企业的参与双方（创业者、投资者）基于资源互补开展合作,由于创业企业不确定性和信息不对称性引发双边道德风险.本文通过建立基于互补效应的单阶段和两阶段收益分配模型,说明了无资本约束条件下基于创业者创业能力的信号来进行阶段投资决策的激励模式不能直接促进次优水平的提升,互补效应不能掩盖道德风险问题,以此对创业者和投资者有所警示.
창업기업적삼여쌍방（창업자、투자자）기우자원호보개전합작,유우창업기업불학정성화신식불대칭성인발쌍변도덕풍험.본문통과건립기우호보효응적단계단화량계단수익분배모형,설명료무자본약속조건하기우창업자창업능력적신호래진행계단투자결책적격려모식불능직접촉진차우수평적제승,호보효응불능엄개도덕풍험문제,이차대창업자화투자자유소경시.
The new venture enterprise is an important component of the national economy. In the second half of last century, huge economic benefits brought about by the success of venture enterprises in USA have attracted much attention from society. Venture capital and human capital are essential to the success of start-ups. The cooperation between entrepreneurships and investors involves high risk, operational uncertainty, information asymmetry, and moral hazard. These factors may negatively affect the growth of venture enterprises. The moral hazard has complementary effect on the successful cooperation between enterprises and investors; however, the effect has not been fully discussed in the current literature. Investors in a venture enterprise provide not only funds, but also management support. This means that entrepreneurs gain from investors both money and wisdom. Meanwhile, the efforts of entrepreneurs and investors have complementary effect. Most studies on the contracts of venture enterprises, either in a single stage or multiple stages, always focus on entrepreneurs, who make use of funds from investors to develop a venture enterprise. The venture investors are rarely mentioned. Although some studies analyze investors＇ contribution to the management of a venture enterprise, they focus solely on their separated efforts, and neglect the complementary effect. Therefore, this paper will analyze the contract arrangement of single phase and two phases from the perspective of the complementary effect. Based on the complementary effect of enterprise participates, the paper establishes a single phase and two phase model. Our analysis results show that the actual complementary coefficient between venture participants would only amplify the horizontal effect, but not reduce the longitudinal risk. The actual complementary coefficient between venture investors and entrepreneurs reflects the degree of their cooperation based on the complementary resources, and amplifies the complementary effect. In the model analysis, the actual complementary coefficient affects the trend of optimal allocation of the surplus earnings, and also affects the preference of optimal allocation ratio between individual effect and complementary effect. However, the complementary coefficient does not directly promote the effort level concerning the optimal allocation path. In addition, the investors can deliver the right to share in earnings to achieve the risk evasion. Investment protection in investors reflects risk preferences. The relationship between the investment risk evasion requirements and the right to share in earnings would provide grounds for the creation of financial tools. Finally, according to the optimal allocation ratio of the complementary effects we can achieve the sub-optimal level under the condition of information asymmetry. However, when there are no capital constraints, the staged investment decision incentive mode fails to promote the sub-optimal level.