CAJ | 학술논문

目前,过度自信代理人激励机制研究基本上以净收益为基础、以当期业绩为标准.本文以价值创造为业绩计量标准,采用长短期业绩相结合的方式,依据代理人为企业创造的当期业绩和未来业绩,并考虑代理人与委托人过度自信及风险偏好,构建激励模型,检验长短期业绩相结合的薪酬契约设计模式对代理人产生的激励效应,揭示过度自信条件下代理人的努力水平及其对企业剩余分享的要求.研究发现代理人与委托人过度自信程度以及风险喜好程度对代理人努力水平产生重要影响.与此同时,研究发现垄断行业代理人努力水平远远低于竞争性行业,且行业垄断盈余比例越大,代理人的努力水平越低.
목전,과도자신대리인격려궤제연구기본상이정수익위기출、이당기업적위표준.본문이개치창조위업적계량표준,채용장단기업적상결합적방식,의거대리인위기업창조적당기업적화미래업적,병고필대리인여위탁인과도자신급풍험편호,구건격려모형,검험장단기업적상결합적신수계약설계모식대대리인산생적격려효응,게시과도자신조건하대리인적노력수평급기대기업잉여분향적요구.연구발현대리인여위탁인과도자신정도이급풍험희호정도대대리인노력수평산생중요영향.여차동시,연구발현롱단행업대리인노력수평원원저우경쟁성행업,차행업롱단영여비례월대,대리인적노력수평월저.
The current research on overconfident agent＇s incentive mechanisms is based on net profit and current period performance. However, net profit is only the matching result of whole income and whole expenditure according to accrual basis. Since net profit doesn＇t include the cost of equity capital, it cannot reflect an enterprise＇s value creation. Current period performance, also named shortterm performance, lies primarily on an agent＇s short-term effort. In fact, an agent＇s effort includes not only short-term effort but also long-term effort, such as research development and market development. The contribution of long-term effort may not be able to improve the current period performance. On the contrary, it decreases the current period performance because of investment. It can influence an agent＇s short-term game behavior. This paper uses value creation as performance measurement standard and designs overconfident agent＇s incentive model by combining long-term and short-term performance according to current period performance and future performance. This paper uses principal and agent＇s overconfidence degree and risk preference, tests the incentive effect of compensation contract for agent based on combined long-term and short-term performance, and reveals agent＇s effort and requirement for surplus share proportion. Important findings are drawn from this study. Firstly, the higher an agent＇s degree of overconfidence for unfavorable factors, the smaller the required surplus share proportion is, and the lower the working effort level is. Contrary findings can be found for favorable factors. Secondly, the higher the principal＇s degree of overconfidence degree for unfavorable factors, the bigger the surplus share proportion an agent can receive and the greater an agent＇s effort is. Contrary findings can be found for favorable factors. Thirdly, the stronger an agent＇s risk preference, the higher the distribution proportion of long-term and short-term effort is, and the lower an agent＇s effort is. The stronger a principal＇s risk preference, the bigger the surplus share proportion of long-term and short-term performance is and the greater an agent＇s effort is. Fourthly, agents in monopoly industries make less effort than ones in competitive industries. The greater the proportion of monopoly earnings is, the less effort agents make. Therefore, it is necessary to introduce competitive mechanism in monopoly industries or transform monopoly industries to competitive industries in order to motivate agents＇ enthusiasm.