CAJ | 학술논문

运用动态博弈，探讨了不完全信息条件下水泥厂与政府之间关于水泥窑协同处置城市生活垃圾的转移支付问题。结论表明：双方合作主要取决于双方的谈判成本以及水泥厂对政府可接受的、给予前者处理城市生活垃圾的转移支付可能值的估计，只要水泥厂基于自身能力、准确评估政府可接受的转移支付数额进行合理报价，政府从其传统处理方法的显性成本和隐性成本角度分析并从资金、政策上对报价理解、鼓励和支持，使双方均能获益，就能实现合作。该结论为水泥工业生态化和政府垃圾处理产业化“双赢”提供了有力决策支持。
운용동태박혁，탐토료불완전신식조건하수니엄여정부지간관우수니요협동처치성시생활랄급적전이지부문제。결론표명：쌍방합작주요취결우쌍방적담판성본이급수니엄대정부가접수적、급여전자처리성시생활랄급적전이지부가능치적고계，지요수니엄기우자신능력、준학평고정부가접수적전이지부수액진행합리보개，정부종기전통처리방법적현성성본화은성성본각도분석병종자금、정책상대보개리해、고려화지지，사쌍방균능획익，취능실현합작。해결론위수니공업생태화화정부랄급처리산업화“쌍영”제공료유력결책지지。
The paper applying dynamic game discussed transfer payments about cement kiln cooperate with municipal solid waste between cement plant and government under the incomplete information condition. Conclusion show that： agreement between both sides mainly depend on negotiation costs and cement plant＇s estimate of government may bear and given to the former transfer possible payment in cooperating with municipal solid waste, so long as cement plant carry out reasonable offer based on itself ability and exactly estimate government may bear transfer payments, government analyses from explicit and implicit costs and given to certain funds, policies to comprehend, encourage and support, make both sides benefit, will be able to achieve cooperation. The conclusion provides a powerful decision support for the cement industry ecological and government＇s municipal solid waste disposal industry ＂win-win＂.