国土资源科技管理
國土資源科技管理
국토자원과기관리
Scientific and Technological Management of Land and Resources
2013年
6期
48~52
,共null页
农户 进化博弈 耕地保护 激励机制
農戶 進化博弈 耕地保護 激勵機製
농호 진화박혁 경지보호 격려궤제
farmer; evolutionary game ; farmland protection ; incentives
当前我国耕地面积不断减少,耕地质量不断退化,国家粮食安全面临严重威胁,耕地保护形势严峻。基于进化博弈视角分析农户耕地保护的行为决策得知:农户的耕地保护行为具有群体效应,农户参与耕地保护和不参与的动态均衡关系,最终取决于两种行为的收益比重,如果选择参与耕地保护的收益低于不参与的选择,那么大多数农户受经济利益诱导,将离开耕地转向非农产业,如选择外出务T等。因此,建议政府提高耕地保护的经济效益,建立耕地保护基金制度,落实完善多种补贴、支持和优惠政策,完善农村社会服务体系来提高农户参与耕地保护的收益,增强农户参与耕地保护的积极性。
噹前我國耕地麵積不斷減少,耕地質量不斷退化,國傢糧食安全麵臨嚴重威脅,耕地保護形勢嚴峻。基于進化博弈視角分析農戶耕地保護的行為決策得知:農戶的耕地保護行為具有群體效應,農戶參與耕地保護和不參與的動態均衡關繫,最終取決于兩種行為的收益比重,如果選擇參與耕地保護的收益低于不參與的選擇,那麽大多數農戶受經濟利益誘導,將離開耕地轉嚮非農產業,如選擇外齣務T等。因此,建議政府提高耕地保護的經濟效益,建立耕地保護基金製度,落實完善多種補貼、支持和優惠政策,完善農村社會服務體繫來提高農戶參與耕地保護的收益,增彊農戶參與耕地保護的積極性。
당전아국경지면적불단감소,경지질량불단퇴화,국가양식안전면림엄중위협,경지보호형세엄준。기우진화박혁시각분석농호경지보호적행위결책득지:농호적경지보호행위구유군체효응,농호삼여경지보호화불삼여적동태균형관계,최종취결우량충행위적수익비중,여과선택삼여경지보호적수익저우불삼여적선택,나요대다수농호수경제이익유도,장리개경지전향비농산업,여선택외출무T등。인차,건의정부제고경지보호적경제효익,건립경지보호기금제도,락실완선다충보첩、지지화우혜정책,완선농촌사회복무체계래제고농호삼여경지보호적수익,증강농호삼여경지보호적적겁성。
Now that arable land is shrinking and land quality is increasingly degraded, national food security and farmland protection are facing a serious threat. From the perspective of Evolutionary Game, this paper analyzes the farmers~ behavior choices in land protection and finds out that farmers' action in land protection has a group effect. The dynamic equilitarium between the involvement and the non-involvement in the farmland protection ultimately depends on the income proportion of the two actions. If the involvement results in a lower income, then farmers would turn to non agricultural industries, such as doing a migrant job. Therefore, it is recommended that government should raise the economic benefits of farmland protection, establish the system of farmland protection fund, improve a variety of subsidies, support and preferential policies, improve rural social service oriented system to increase farmers' benefits in land protection, and make farmers more initiative in protecting the cultivated land.