CAJ | 학술논문

环境保护事务的特殊性决定了财政联邦主义无法也不可能替代环境联邦主义，只有依据环境事务的内在逻辑，构建直接度量环境分权的指标体系，才能够全面客观揭示环境分权背后的效应机理。立足环境管理体制变迁的视角。本文系统梳理了中国环境分权演进的三个阶段，运用环境机构人员分布数据，测算环境分权、行政分权、监测分权和监察分权指数，阐述了分权指数变化的内在逻辑。在此基础上，采用静态、动态和动态空间面板模型及方法．考察了环境分权与环境污染之间的关系。研究发现，四类分权与环境污染之间呈现出显著且稳定的正向关系．环境分权加剧了财政分权对环境保护的激励不足．西部地区环境分权的负面影响更为明显：伴随着环境分权度的下降，其年度效应逐步降低并由正转负，凸显了近年来中央政府环保干预力度加大的有效性和重要性；环境分权、监测分权与环境污染呈U型关系，而行政分权、监察分权与环境污染呈倒U型关系，赋予地方政府适度有限的环境管理权、监测权以及充分的环境行政权和监察权更有利于改进环境治理。推进环境管理体制结构性改革与做对地方环境保护激励约束是持续提升中国环境治理水平和改善环境质量的重要制度基础。
배경보호사무적특수성결정료재정련방주의무법야불가능체대배경련방주의，지유의거배경사무적내재라집，구건직접도량배경분권적지표체계，재능구전면객관게시배경분권배후적효응궤리。립족배경관리체제변천적시각。본문계통소리료중국배경분권연진적삼개계단，운용배경궤구인원분포수거，측산배경분권、행정분권、감측분권화감찰분권지수，천술료분권지수변화적내재라집。재차기출상，채용정태、동태화동태공간면판모형급방법．고찰료배경분권여배경오염지간적관계。연구발현，사류분권여배경오염지간정현출현저차은정적정향관계．배경분권가극료재정분권대배경보호적격려불족．서부지구배경분권적부면영향경위명현：반수착배경분권도적하강，기년도효응축보강저병유정전부，철현료근년래중앙정부배보간예력도가대적유효성화중요성；배경분권、감측분권여배경오염정U형관계，이행정분권、감찰분권여배경오염정도U형관계，부여지방정부괄도유한적배경관리권、감측권이급충분적배경행정권화감찰권경유리우개진배경치리。추진배경관리체제결구성개혁여주대지방배경보호격려약속시지속제승중국배경치리수평화개선배경질량적중요제도기출。
The distinctiveness of environmental protection affair determines that fiscal federalism can not substitute for environmental federalism. Only through constructing index system which directly measures fiscal decentralization according to the inherent logic of environmental affair, can we objectively reveal the effect mechanism of environmental decentralization. In the perspective of environmental regulation, this paper reviews three stages of China＇s environmental decentralization evolution, measuring the index of environmental, administrative, monitoring and inspecting decentralization with distribution data of environmental agency staff, describes the internal logic of decentralization index changes. On this basis, we examine the correlation between environmental decentralization and environmental pollution by using static and dynamic methods and dynamic spatial panel model. We find that, environmental, administrative, monitoring and inspecting decentralization have significant positive correlation with environmental pollution and environmental decentralization further lowers the incentive of environmental protection to local governments, which is much more significant in western area; With the decreasing environmental decentralization, its annual effect reduces from positive to negative, which demonstrates the significance and effectiveness of central government＇s increasing intervention on environmental protection; We find a U-shaped relationship between environmental, monitoring decentralization and environmental pollution and an inverted U-shaped relationship between administrative, inspecting decentralization and environmental pollution, which shows that conferring limited environmental management and monitoring authority to local governments and conferring full environmental administration and inspection authority to local governments would help to improve environmental protection affair. Pushing forward the structural reform of environmental management and construct the incentive and restraint mechanism are important institutional foundation to ensure the increasing improvement of environmental protection and management.