中国工业经济
中國工業經濟
중국공업경제
China Industrial Economy
2014年
1期
88~100
,共null页
董事会 董事会会议 通讯会议 现场会议 公司治理
董事會 董事會會議 通訊會議 現場會議 公司治理
동사회 동사회회의 통신회의 현장회의 공사치리
the board; board meeting; telephonic meetings; on-site meeting; corporate governance
董事会是公司治理的核心,董事会会议是董事会发挥其职能的重要途径。本文以中国上市公司中通讯会议形式渐成为董事会会议主流趋势现象为背景.基于委托代理理论及决策模式理论.分析了应用董事会通讯会议形式的上市公司基本特征.对比了影响公司采用不同董事会会议形式因素的差异性.并进一步检验了董事会会议不同形式的价值效应。本文发现上市公司董事会规模、两职兼任、董事会持股情况等一系列治理特征影响了公司对董事会会议形式的选择.且董事会通讯会议与现场会议的影响因素及价值效应差异性显著。另外还发现,通讯会议在一定程度上保证了董事能够亲自出席董事会会议并参加表决。本文的研究为进一步完善上市公司董事会会议机制提供了直接的经验证据。
董事會是公司治理的覈心,董事會會議是董事會髮揮其職能的重要途徑。本文以中國上市公司中通訊會議形式漸成為董事會會議主流趨勢現象為揹景.基于委託代理理論及決策模式理論.分析瞭應用董事會通訊會議形式的上市公司基本特徵.對比瞭影響公司採用不同董事會會議形式因素的差異性.併進一步檢驗瞭董事會會議不同形式的價值效應。本文髮現上市公司董事會規模、兩職兼任、董事會持股情況等一繫列治理特徵影響瞭公司對董事會會議形式的選擇.且董事會通訊會議與現場會議的影響因素及價值效應差異性顯著。另外還髮現,通訊會議在一定程度上保證瞭董事能夠親自齣席董事會會議併參加錶決。本文的研究為進一步完善上市公司董事會會議機製提供瞭直接的經驗證據。
동사회시공사치리적핵심,동사회회의시동사회발휘기직능적중요도경。본문이중국상시공사중통신회의형식점성위동사회회의주류추세현상위배경.기우위탁대리이론급결책모식이론.분석료응용동사회통신회의형식적상시공사기본특정.대비료영향공사채용불동동사회회의형식인소적차이성.병진일보검험료동사회회의불동형식적개치효응。본문발현상시공사동사회규모、량직겸임、동사회지고정황등일계렬치리특정영향료공사대동사회회의형식적선택.차동사회통신회의여현장회의적영향인소급개치효응차이성현저。령외환발현,통신회의재일정정도상보증료동사능구친자출석동사회회의병삼가표결。본문적연구위진일보완선상시공사동사회회의궤제제공료직접적경험증거。
The board is the core of corporate governance. Board meeting is an important way to execute the functions of the board. The telephonic meeting has become the mainstream to have a board meeting in the listed companies of China. Based on the principal-agent theory and the theory of social decision model, we analyzed the basic characteristics of the listed companies in which conduct the telephonic meeting. By comparing the differences of determinant factors between different board meeting forms, and testing the value effect of the different board meeting forms, we found that the listed companies' board size, leadership structure, board ownership and a series of governance characteristics influence the companies' choices of board meeting forms. The differences of the determinant factors and value effect are significant. This paper also found that the telephonic meeting ensured the director to attend the board meeting and vote. This study provides direct empirical evidence for the further improvement of board meeting mechanism in the listed companies.