CAJ | 학술논문

通过构建简单的上、下游市场古诺竞争模型，研究了在上游外资企业不存在效率优势时，外资纵向兼并我国企业对上游投入品价格、最终产品价格和社会福利的影响。研究发现：在一定条件下，兼并厂商会实施市场封锁，但兼并后中间投入品价格、最终产品价格都会下降。模型结果还显示：国内企业间纵向兼并的总福利增加总是高于外资企业并购国内企业的总福利增加，外资纵向并购时竞争效果评估与鼓励国内企业间兼并的产业政策目标是基本一致的。
통과구건간단적상、하유시장고낙경쟁모형，연구료재상유외자기업불존재효솔우세시，외자종향겸병아국기업대상유투입품개격、최종산품개격화사회복리적영향。연구발현：재일정조건하，겸병엄상회실시시장봉쇄，단겸병후중간투입품개격、최종산품개격도회하강。모형결과환현시：국내기업간종향겸병적총복리증가총시고우외자기업병구국내기업적총복리증가，외자종향병구시경쟁효과평고여고려국내기업간겸병적산업정책목표시기본일치적。
By constructing simple Cournot competition model ,this article analyzes foreign vertical merger＆#39;s effect on the price of upstream firms input and the final product and the total welfare in the absence of efficiency advantage . It is found that although the merged will implement market foreclosure under certain conditions ,price of the input and final product is still reduced .In addition , the increase of total welfare in the merger between domestic enterprises is always higher than that in the foreign acquisition of domestic enterprises .This article also proves that in the case of foreign vertical merger ,the aim of the competition policy is coordinated with that of the merger between domestic enterprises .