CAJ | 학술논문

文章分析了中央银行在政策目标、决策依据和政策效果评价三方面的透明性对货币政策可信度的影响效应，研究结果表明：保持政策适度透明是偏好于价格稳定的央行用以显示其低通胀偏好，以获得公众信任并稳定其通胀预期的良好机制；央行公布预测不会影响长期平均通胀水平和平均产出，但有助于降低通胀的波动性；受现实约束，最优透明度是有边界的。文章进而提供了支持这些理论结果的强有力的经验证据：各国通胀水平、通胀和产出的波动性在央行货币政策透明度提高以后都有显著的下降；回归分析显示，代表货币政策可信度的通货膨胀波动性与透明度显著负相关，最优透明度处于某个中间水平。
문장분석료중앙은행재정책목표、결책의거화정책효과평개삼방면적투명성대화폐정책가신도적영향효응，연구결과표명：보지정책괄도투명시편호우개격은정적앙행용이현시기저통창편호，이획득공음신임병은정기통창예기적량호궤제；앙행공포예측불회영향장기평균통창수평화평균산출，단유조우강저통창적파동성；수현실약속，최우투명도시유변계적。문장진이제공료지지저사이론결과적강유력적경험증거：각국통창수평、통창화산출적파동성재앙행화폐정책투명도제고이후도유현저적하강；회귀분석현시，대표화폐정책가신도적통화팽창파동성여투명도현저부상관，최우투명도처우모개중간수평。
This paper analyzes the effect central bank transparency in monetary policy goals, policy - making basis and policy evaluation has on the credibility and impact of monetary policy. We obtain the following theo- retical results ： Central banks, which prefer price stability, can use transparency to show their preference for low inflation to the public, so that they can obtain more public trust and stabilize inflation expectations. Central banks announcing their forecasts in advance does not affect the long - term average inflation and output, but contributes to reducing the volatility of inflation. Central Bank Transparency is limited to constraints or reality. Further, we provides strong empirical evidence that： 1 ） inflation and variations in inflation and output are sig- nificantly reduced after the transparency of monetary policy is improved; 2） some regression analysis showed that variations in inflation variation are significantly negatively correlated with central banks＇ transparency; and 3 ） optimal transparency is at some intermediate level.