CAJ | 학술논문

中央与地方在土地节约集约利用过程中存在着违规一监管的博弈。通过分析纯策略纳什均衡和混合策略纳什均衡两种情况，发现存在“激励悖论”现象，监管成本较高是导致地方政府违规的重要因素，未来应采取改革财政分配制度、引入更先进的监管技术手段等方式促使地方政府遵循中央政策。
중앙여지방재토지절약집약이용과정중존재착위규일감관적박혁。통과분석순책략납십균형화혼합책략납십균형량충정황，발현존재“격려패론”현상，감관성본교고시도치지방정부위규적중요인소，미래응채취개혁재정분배제도、인입경선진적감관기술수단등방식촉사지방정부준순중앙정책。
In land saving and intensive use require- ments, there is a supervision game between the central and local government. On the basis of the analysis of pure strategy Nash e-quilibrium and mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, the phenome-non of “ paradox of motivation” is found, and high regulatory costs is an important factor affecting the local government＇s ille- al behaviors. In the future, it should be taken to reform the fi- nancial allocation system and introduce the more advanced su- pervision technical means, which will prompt the local govern- ment to comply with the central policy.