国际经贸探索
國際經貿探索
국제경무탐색
International Economics and Trade Research
2014年
2期
39~51
,共null页
出口补贴 出口征税 碳关税 贸易政策 博弈
齣口補貼 齣口徵稅 碳關稅 貿易政策 博弈
출구보첩 출구정세 탄관세 무역정책 박혁
export subsidy; export tariff; carbon tariff; trade policy; game model
基于发展中国家和发达国家在生产成本和碳排放强度上均存在差异的事实,发达国家若实施碳关税政策.发展中国家可选择是否实施贸易政策(包括出口补贴和出口征税)以及何时实施贸易政策.文章构建了发展中国家不实施贸易政策、与发达国家开征碳关税同时或之后实施贸易政策的多阶段博弈模型,运用逆向求解法求得各模型的均衡解,从发展中国家立场出发,得出了其政策选择的条件以及实施贸易政策的时机。结果表明发展中国家实施出口补贴政策或出口征税政策都有可能是最优的,这要视边际环境损害值大小、各国生产成本和碳排放强度差异决定,但实施该政策的最佳时机总是在发达国家开征碳关税以后;若边际环境损害值较小,发展中国家不实施任何贸易政策是次优的,否则与发达国家开征碳关税同时实施出口征税政策是次优的。
基于髮展中國傢和髮達國傢在生產成本和碳排放彊度上均存在差異的事實,髮達國傢若實施碳關稅政策.髮展中國傢可選擇是否實施貿易政策(包括齣口補貼和齣口徵稅)以及何時實施貿易政策.文章構建瞭髮展中國傢不實施貿易政策、與髮達國傢開徵碳關稅同時或之後實施貿易政策的多階段博弈模型,運用逆嚮求解法求得各模型的均衡解,從髮展中國傢立場齣髮,得齣瞭其政策選擇的條件以及實施貿易政策的時機。結果錶明髮展中國傢實施齣口補貼政策或齣口徵稅政策都有可能是最優的,這要視邊際環境損害值大小、各國生產成本和碳排放彊度差異決定,但實施該政策的最佳時機總是在髮達國傢開徵碳關稅以後;若邊際環境損害值較小,髮展中國傢不實施任何貿易政策是次優的,否則與髮達國傢開徵碳關稅同時實施齣口徵稅政策是次優的。
기우발전중국가화발체국가재생산성본화탄배방강도상균존재차이적사실,발체국가약실시탄관세정책.발전중국가가선택시부실시무역정책(포괄출구보첩화출구정세)이급하시실시무역정책.문장구건료발전중국가불실시무역정책、여발체국가개정탄관세동시혹지후실시무역정책적다계단박혁모형,운용역향구해법구득각모형적균형해,종발전중국가립장출발,득출료기정책선택적조건이급실시무역정책적시궤。결과표명발전중국가실시출구보첩정책혹출구정세정책도유가능시최우적,저요시변제배경손해치대소、각국생산성본화탄배방강도차이결정,단실시해정책적최가시궤총시재발체국가개정탄관세이후;약변제배경손해치교소,발전중국가불실시임하무역정책시차우적,부칙여발체국가개정탄관세동시실시출구정세정책시차우적。
Based on the fact that a developing country and a developed country are different in both production cost and carbon emission intensity, if the developed country is about to carry out a carbon tariff policy, the developing country can decide whether to carry out trade policies, including export policy and export tariff policy, and when to implement that policy. The paper establishes three multi-staged game models individually, and applies the method of backward induction to make an analysis. It shows that the developing country may give priority to either export subsidy or export tariff policies if the developed country carries out a carbon tariff policy, which depends on the magnitude of marginal environmental damage, and differences in both production cost and carbon emission intensity. It also shows that the choice that the developing country does nothing is a second best choice if the marginal environmental damage is smaller, otherwise, the choice that the developing country levies export tariff when the developed country carries out carbon tariff would be a second best choice.