财经研究
財經研究
재경연구
The Study of Finance and Economics
2014年
3期
85~93
,共null页
二元转型 信息流动变异 借贷合约激励设计
二元轉型 信息流動變異 藉貸閤約激勵設計
이원전형 신식류동변이 차대합약격려설계
dual transformation; information flow variation; incentive design of debtcontracts
文章在标准的借贷合约委托一代理模型基础上,通过引入二元转型所引起的信息流动变异,构建了一个农村借贷合约的拓展模型,提出了两个研究假说:一是农村金融机构借贷合约的激励结构设计随二元转型过程而变化;二是农村金融机构借贷合约的激励结构设计对金融机构类型具有敏感性。文章在此基础上利用泊松受限因变量模型进行了实证检验,主要得到以下结果:第一,反映二元转型与金融机构类型的系数均显著不为0,这为两个研究假说提供了经验证据;第二,新型农村金融机构的出现并没有降低农户的违约成本,合约的声誉自执行机制仍是有效的;第三,新型农村金融机构的出现对解决农村金融市场严重的信息不对称问题具有显著作用,农户借贷须提供抵押品的比例明显降低。文章的一个重要政策含义是,从优化借贷合约的角度看,进一步放宽农村金融机构准入限制,进而优化农村金融机构结构,或许是比利率市场化更有效的政策选择。
文章在標準的藉貸閤約委託一代理模型基礎上,通過引入二元轉型所引起的信息流動變異,構建瞭一箇農村藉貸閤約的拓展模型,提齣瞭兩箇研究假說:一是農村金融機構藉貸閤約的激勵結構設計隨二元轉型過程而變化;二是農村金融機構藉貸閤約的激勵結構設計對金融機構類型具有敏感性。文章在此基礎上利用泊鬆受限因變量模型進行瞭實證檢驗,主要得到以下結果:第一,反映二元轉型與金融機構類型的繫數均顯著不為0,這為兩箇研究假說提供瞭經驗證據;第二,新型農村金融機構的齣現併沒有降低農戶的違約成本,閤約的聲譽自執行機製仍是有效的;第三,新型農村金融機構的齣現對解決農村金融市場嚴重的信息不對稱問題具有顯著作用,農戶藉貸鬚提供牴押品的比例明顯降低。文章的一箇重要政策含義是,從優化藉貸閤約的角度看,進一步放寬農村金融機構準入限製,進而優化農村金融機構結構,或許是比利率市場化更有效的政策選擇。
문장재표준적차대합약위탁일대리모형기출상,통과인입이원전형소인기적신식류동변이,구건료일개농촌차대합약적탁전모형,제출료량개연구가설:일시농촌금융궤구차대합약적격려결구설계수이원전형과정이변화;이시농촌금융궤구차대합약적격려결구설계대금융궤구류형구유민감성。문장재차기출상이용박송수한인변량모형진행료실증검험,주요득도이하결과:제일,반영이원전형여금융궤구류형적계수균현저불위0,저위량개연구가설제공료경험증거;제이,신형농촌금융궤구적출현병몰유강저농호적위약성본,합약적성예자집행궤제잉시유효적;제삼,신형농촌금융궤구적출현대해결농촌금융시장엄중적신식불대칭문제구유현저작용,농호차대수제공저압품적비례명현강저。문장적일개중요정책함의시,종우화차대합약적각도간,진일보방관농촌금융궤구준입한제,진이우화농촌금융궤구결구,혹허시비리솔시장화경유효적정책선택。
Based on a standard principal-agent model concerning debt contracts, this pa- per constructs an extended model of rural debt contracts by the introduction of information flow variation caused by dual transformation, and puts forward two hypotheses as follows. the incentive design of debt contracts of rural financial institutions changes in the process of dual transformation; the incentive design of debt contracts of rural financial institutions is sensitive to the types of financial institutions. By using the Poisson restriction dependent var- iable model, it makes the empirical test and comes to the main results as follows, firstly, co- efficients reflecting dual transformation and the types of financial institutions are significant- ly different from zero, providing evidence for the two hypotheses; secondly, the emergence of new types of rural financial institutions does not reduce the default costs of rural house- holds, and the contract reputation self-enforcement mechanism is still effective; thirdly, the emergence of new types of rural financial institutions plays a significant role in the solution to serious information asymmetry of rural financial market, and the ratio of collateral con- tracts significantly reduces. This paper gives important policy implication that from the per- spective of the optimization of debt contracts, further relaxation on access restriction of rural financial institutions and thus optimization of the structure of rural financial institutions may be a more efficient policy choice than the marketization of interest rates.