财经研究
財經研究
재경연구
The Study of Finance and Economics
2014年
3期
124~134
,共null页
公平性偏好 私人控制权收益 公司价值 行业基准
公平性偏好 私人控製權收益 公司價值 行業基準
공평성편호 사인공제권수익 공사개치 행업기준
fairness preference; private benefit of control; firm value; industry benchmark
文章以2007—2011年我国A股上市公司为样本，探讨了高管将其私人控制权收益在同行业内做比较时所产生的公平性感受对公司价值的影响，揭示了高管公平性偏好的作用机理。研究发现：（1）相对于股权分散或者存在股权制衡的公司，股权集中公司高管控制权收益绝对额及控制权收益一公司价值敏感性较高，而额外控制权收益的分布情况却与之大相径庭。国有控股公司的高管控制权收益绝对额均值最大，但额外控制权收益均值较小；而家族控股公司的高管控制权收益绝对额均值最小，但额外控制权收益均值较大。（2）控制权收益绝对额与额外控制权收益的激励方向相反。相对于股权分散或者存在股权制衡的公司，股权集中公司高管控制权收益绝对额显著降低公司价值，而正向额外控制权收益显著提升公司价值，负向额外控制权收益则显著降低公司价值。
文章以2007—2011年我國A股上市公司為樣本，探討瞭高管將其私人控製權收益在同行業內做比較時所產生的公平性感受對公司價值的影響，揭示瞭高管公平性偏好的作用機理。研究髮現：（1）相對于股權分散或者存在股權製衡的公司，股權集中公司高管控製權收益絕對額及控製權收益一公司價值敏感性較高，而額外控製權收益的分佈情況卻與之大相徑庭。國有控股公司的高管控製權收益絕對額均值最大，但額外控製權收益均值較小；而傢族控股公司的高管控製權收益絕對額均值最小，但額外控製權收益均值較大。（2）控製權收益絕對額與額外控製權收益的激勵方嚮相反。相對于股權分散或者存在股權製衡的公司，股權集中公司高管控製權收益絕對額顯著降低公司價值，而正嚮額外控製權收益顯著提升公司價值，負嚮額外控製權收益則顯著降低公司價值。
문장이2007—2011년아국A고상시공사위양본，탐토료고관장기사인공제권수익재동행업내주비교시소산생적공평성감수대공사개치적영향，게시료고관공평성편호적작용궤리。연구발현：（1）상대우고권분산혹자존재고권제형적공사，고권집중공사고관공제권수익절대액급공제권수익일공사개치민감성교고，이액외공제권수익적분포정황각여지대상경정。국유공고공사적고관공제권수익절대액균치최대，단액외공제권수익균치교소；이가족공고공사적고관공제권수익절대액균치최소，단액외공제권수익균치교대。（2）공제권수익절대액여액외공제권수익적격려방향상반。상대우고권분산혹자존재고권제형적공사，고권집중공사고관공제권수익절대액현저강저공사개치，이정향액외공제권수익현저제승공사개치，부향액외공제권수익칙현저강저공사개치。
Based on a sample of A-share listed companies in China from 2007 to 2011, this pa- per examines the impact of fairness feelings concerning an industry comparison of private benefits of control on firm value and reveals the function mechanism of executive fairness preference. It comes to the following conclusions： firstly, compared to companies with dispersed ownership or outside block-holders, the absolute amount of private benefits of control and the sensitivity of private benefits of control to firm value are higher in companies with concentrated owner- ship, but the distribution of additional private benefits of control differs widely; the mean of the absolute amount of private benefits of control in state-owned companies is the largest, but the mean of additional private benefits of control is smaller; the mean of the absolute a- mount of private benefits of control in family-controlled companies is the smallest, but the mean of additional private benefits of control is larger; secondly, the incentive direction of the absolute amount of private benefits of control is the opposite of the one of additional pri- vate benefits of control; compared to companies with dispersed ownership or outside block- holders, the absolute amount of private benefits of control significantly reduces firm value, and positive or negative additional private benefits of control can significantly increase or re- duce firm value respectively in companies with concentrated ownership.
