CAJ | 학술논문

文章以博弈论为研究方法，基于政府对制造商废品回收进行补贴和不补贴两种情形，分析零售商、第三方废品回收商价格竞争环境下，由制造商、零售商和第三方废品回收商组成的再制造闭环供应链决策前后最优策略的变化。研究结果表明：政府对制造商废品回收进行补贴时，零售商、第三方废品回收商的废品回收量、回收价格、废品出售价格以及制造商、零售商、第三方废品回收商的利润均高于政府不提供补贴时的情形，且政府补贴程度越大，上述值越大。最后通过数值算例和仿真分析验证了模型的正确性。
문장이박혁론위연구방법，기우정부대제조상폐품회수진행보첩화불보첩량충정형，분석령수상、제삼방폐품회수상개격경쟁배경하，유제조상、령수상화제삼방폐품회수상조성적재제조폐배공응련결책전후최우책략적변화。연구결과표명：정부대제조상폐품회수진행보첩시，령수상、제삼방폐품회수상적폐품회수량、회수개격、폐품출수개격이급제조상、령수상、제삼방폐품회수상적리윤균고우정부불제공보첩시적정형，차정부보첩정도월대，상술치월대。최후통과수치산례화방진분석험증료모형적정학성。
The paper uses game theory as a research method,based on with or without government subsidies for recycling man-ufacturers. It analyzes the changes of the optimal strategies before and after decision-making on remanufactured closed-loop supply chain,which consists of manufacturers,retailers and the third-party scrap recyclers,under the price competition be-tween retailers and the third-party scrap recyclers. The results show that,when the government provides subsidies for recycling manufacturers, the amount of recycling, recycling prices, scrap sales prices of the retailers and the third party scrap recy-clers,and the profits of the manufacturers,retailers and third-party are all higher than the government does not provide subsi-dies to them,and the greater the degree of the government subsidies,the greater the value mentioned above. Finally,the va-lidity of the model is verified by numerical calculations and simulation analyses.