中国工业经济
中國工業經濟
중국공업경제
China Industrial Economy
2014年
2期
84~96
,共null页
中央企业 国有企业利润上交比例 股利政策 代理成本
中央企業 國有企業利潤上交比例 股利政策 代理成本
중앙기업 국유기업리윤상교비례 고리정책 대리성본
central enterprise; percentage of SOEs' profits paid to the state; dividend policy; agency cost
本文首先构建了一个关于一般竞争性行业国有企业利润最优上交比例的理论模型:对于那些企业投资回报高于社会平均资本成本的国有企业,国有资产监督管理委员会(以下简称国资委)在考虑其利润分配时要权衡两方面成本:一是因利润上交而导致的企业对外融资的交易成本:二是因利润留存于企业而可能被经营层侵蚀的内部代理成本,而利润最优分配应使上述两方面成本之和最小。本文基于一般竞争性行业的62家中央企业数据展开计量分析.并对近几年这些企业的利润最优上交比例进行了估算。结果表明,从近几年中央企业经营数据看.国资委及社会对中央企业的外部监督较为有效.而就其中的净资产回报率高于平均社会资本成本的40家企业而言.由于利润回报率水平普遍较高,同时企业外部融资的交易成本又较高,故这些企业绝大多数其利润应全部留存。因此,若要利用国有经济支持公共福利,主要依赖的不应是竞争性行业的绩优国有企业.而应是垄断性国有企业与竞争性行业中企业投资回报低于社会平均资本成本的国有企业的利润上交.以及对后一类竞争性国有企业的股权减持。
本文首先構建瞭一箇關于一般競爭性行業國有企業利潤最優上交比例的理論模型:對于那些企業投資迴報高于社會平均資本成本的國有企業,國有資產鑑督管理委員會(以下簡稱國資委)在攷慮其利潤分配時要權衡兩方麵成本:一是因利潤上交而導緻的企業對外融資的交易成本:二是因利潤留存于企業而可能被經營層侵蝕的內部代理成本,而利潤最優分配應使上述兩方麵成本之和最小。本文基于一般競爭性行業的62傢中央企業數據展開計量分析.併對近幾年這些企業的利潤最優上交比例進行瞭估算。結果錶明,從近幾年中央企業經營數據看.國資委及社會對中央企業的外部鑑督較為有效.而就其中的淨資產迴報率高于平均社會資本成本的40傢企業而言.由于利潤迴報率水平普遍較高,同時企業外部融資的交易成本又較高,故這些企業絕大多數其利潤應全部留存。因此,若要利用國有經濟支持公共福利,主要依賴的不應是競爭性行業的績優國有企業.而應是壟斷性國有企業與競爭性行業中企業投資迴報低于社會平均資本成本的國有企業的利潤上交.以及對後一類競爭性國有企業的股權減持。
본문수선구건료일개관우일반경쟁성행업국유기업리윤최우상교비례적이론모형:대우나사기업투자회보고우사회평균자본성본적국유기업,국유자산감독관리위원회(이하간칭국자위)재고필기리윤분배시요권형량방면성본:일시인리윤상교이도치적기업대외융자적교역성본:이시인리윤류존우기업이가능피경영층침식적내부대리성본,이리윤최우분배응사상술량방면성본지화최소。본문기우일반경쟁성행업적62가중앙기업수거전개계량분석.병대근궤년저사기업적리윤최우상교비례진행료고산。결과표명,종근궤년중앙기업경영수거간.국자위급사회대중앙기업적외부감독교위유효.이취기중적정자산회보솔고우평균사회자본성본적40가기업이언.유우리윤회보솔수평보편교고,동시기업외부융자적교역성본우교고,고저사기업절대다수기리윤응전부류존。인차,약요이용국유경제지지공공복리,주요의뢰적불응시경쟁성행업적적우국유기업.이응시롱단성국유기업여경쟁성행업중기업투자회보저우사회평균자본성본적국유기업적리윤상교.이급대후일류경쟁성국유기업적고권감지。
Firstly this paper built a theoretical model about the optimal percentage of SOEs' profits paid to the state. The model implied that SASAC would trade off two aspects of cost when considering the profit distribution of those SOEs which investment returns are higher than the average capital cost: one is transaction costs of firms' external financing arising from the profit delivery, another is internal agency costs because of erosion of retained earnings by the management, and the optimal distribution of profits should minimize the two aspects of costs. Then this paper used data of 62 central enterprises in competitive industries to make econometric analysis, and calculated the optimal percentage of those SOEs' profits paid to the state in recent years. The results show that, from the data of central enterprises in recent years, the SASAC and the society's external supervision of central enterprises has been effective. Of most of those 40 SOEs which investment returns are higher than the average capital cost, profits should be retained, because in recent years these SOEs achieve a high profit rate and transaction cost of external financing is too high for them. Therefore, if we make use of the state-owned economy to support public welfare, the main dependence should not be leading SOEs in competitive industries, but should be profit delivery of the monopolistic SOEs and those SOEs in competitive industries which investment returns are lower than the average capital cost, and reduction of state-owned shares in the latter competitive SOEs.