CAJ | 학술논문

选择2006年1月1日至2011年6月30日期间宣告股权激励方案的上市公司为样本，利用新闻搜索引擎搜集样本公司股权激励的媒体报道，通过内容分析法辨别出其中的负面报道，采用负面的股权激励媒体报道数量度量负面媒体关注度．采用公司对媒体报道的反应程度即媒体关注效果表征媒体的公司治理作用，运用逻辑回归方法研究了媒体监督的公司治理作用。研究结果表明，负面媒体关注度越高的公司越倾向于修订其股权激励方案，以回应媒体的质疑。完善自身的激励管理机制。
선택2006년1월1일지2011년6월30일기간선고고권격려방안적상시공사위양본，이용신문수색인경수집양본공사고권격려적매체보도，통과내용분석법변별출기중적부면보도，채용부면적고권격려매체보도수량도량부면매체관주도．채용공사대매체보도적반응정도즉매체관주효과표정매체적공사치리작용，운용라집회귀방법연구료매체감독적공사치리작용。연구결과표명，부면매체관주도월고적공사월경향우수정기고권격려방안，이회응매체적질의。완선자신적격려관리궤제。
A test is conducted on listed companies that implemented equity incentive plan as samples after the announcement of the ＂Measures for the Administration of Equity Incentives of Listed Companies （trial）＂ between January 1st, 2006 and June 30st, 2011. A news search engine is used to collect the sample companies＇ equity incentive, and identify the negative media coverage by using content analysis method. The degree of negative media attention is measured by the number of negative equity incentive media report, and the corporate governance role of the media is measured by the degree of responses to the media reports. The logistic analysis is applied to study corporate governance role of media supervision. The conclusion is that with more negative equity incentive reports, the company is more likely to amend the equity incentive program to respond to the median question and consummate its incentive management mechanism. To some extent, our research confirmed that media can oversight listed companies and play a positive role of improving corporate governance so as to protect the interests of investors.