软科学
軟科學
연과학
Soft Science
2014年
2期
21~26
,共null页
低碳供应链 成本分摊 政府补贴 低碳投入 博弈论
低碳供應鏈 成本分攤 政府補貼 低碳投入 博弈論
저탄공응련 성본분탄 정부보첩 저탄투입 박혁론
low carbon supply chain; cost allocation; government subsidies; low carbon investment; game theory
构建了制造商和零售商的纳什博弈和斯塔克尔伯格博弈两种博弈结构形式,分析了低碳研发成本分摊系数和政府低碳补贴等方面对供应链低碳化研发投入的影响,得出不同博弈形式下的企业低碳研发合作和政府补贴策略.
構建瞭製造商和零售商的納什博弈和斯塔剋爾伯格博弈兩種博弈結構形式,分析瞭低碳研髮成本分攤繫數和政府低碳補貼等方麵對供應鏈低碳化研髮投入的影響,得齣不同博弈形式下的企業低碳研髮閤作和政府補貼策略.
구건료제조상화령수상적납십박혁화사탑극이백격박혁량충박혁결구형식,분석료저탄연발성본분탄계수화정부저탄보첩등방면대공응련저탄화연발투입적영향,득출불동박혁형식하적기업저탄연발합작화정부보첩책략.
This paper selects Nash game and Stackelberg game between manufacturer and retailer, discuss the influence to R＆D costs of low carbon supply chain on cost allocation coefficient and government subsidies, and conclude the strategies between low carbon R＆D cooperation and government subsidies under different game situation.
