CAJ | 학술논문

科学理论的结构问题是科学哲学的重要问题，基于公认观点的理论还原观与基于库恩范式理论的突现观展示了截然不同的科学进步的途径。对比两种观点可知，单纯的还原观和单纯的突现观都不能客观地看待科学的发展，从静态分析科学理论的结构，科学理论并非完全可还原，而是部分可还原；从动态（社会历史角度）分析科学理论的演变，科学理论具有突现的特征，但范式间并非完全不可通约而是部分可通约。范式的部分可通约可借助公认观点的对应规则得到解释。
과학이론적결구문제시과학철학적중요문제，기우공인관점적이론환원관여기우고은범식이론적돌현관전시료절연불동적과학진보적도경。대비량충관점가지，단순적환원관화단순적돌현관도불능객관지간대과학적발전，종정태분석과학이론적결구，과학이론병비완전가환원，이시부분가환원；종동태（사회역사각도）분석과학이론적연변，과학이론구유돌현적특정，단범식간병비완전불가통약이시부분가통약。범식적부분가통약가차조공인관점적대응규칙득도해석。
The structure of scientific theories is an important issue in the philosophy of science, in which theoretic reductionism based on received views and emergentism based on Kuhn＇s paradigm theory take distinct paths of scientific progress. By comparing the two views, this paper points out that neither mere reductionism nor mere emergentism can give an objective description of scientific development. A static analysis of the structure of scientific theories is not completely but partly reducible and a dynamic analysis of the revolution of scientific theories from the perspective of social history does take on an emergent characteristics; however, it is not completely but partly incommensurable between paradigms. It is suggested that the partly commensurability of paradigms can be explained by the corresponding rules of received views.