重庆理工大学学报：社会科学版
重慶理工大學學報：社會科學版
중경리공대학학보：사회과학판
Journal of Chongqing Institute of Technology
2014年
2期
81~83
,共null页
感受性 他心问题 本体论承诺
感受性 他心問題 本體論承諾
감수성 타심문제 본체론승낙
qualia ; the problem of other minds ; ontological commitment
他心问题自提出以来就引起许多学者的关注,对于能否获知他心这一问题至今没有明确的答案.本文在维特根斯坦、罗素及斯特劳森对于他心问题的不同解答的基础上,从感受性角度出发探讨他心问题,认为关于他心知识的获得是可能的,但从根本上理解他心又是不可能的.
他心問題自提齣以來就引起許多學者的關註,對于能否穫知他心這一問題至今沒有明確的答案.本文在維特根斯坦、囉素及斯特勞森對于他心問題的不同解答的基礎上,從感受性角度齣髮探討他心問題,認為關于他心知識的穫得是可能的,但從根本上理解他心又是不可能的.
타심문제자제출이래취인기허다학자적관주,대우능부획지타심저일문제지금몰유명학적답안.본문재유특근사탄、라소급사특로삼대우타심문제적불동해답적기출상,종감수성각도출발탐토타심문제,인위관우타심지식적획득시가능적,단종근본상리해타심우시불가능적.
The problem of other minds has caused many scholars＇ no definite answer has achieved to the question that whether other attentions since its coming up, but minds are likely to be known. This article discusses the problem of other minds through qualia on the basis of Wittgenstein, Russell and Strawson, who ever had different opinions on this problem. This article holds that it is possible for other minds to be known, while it is impossible for other minds to be understood radically.
