管理科学
管理科學
관이과학
Management Sciences in China
2014年
2期
1~14
,共null页
战略决策机制 创始人cEO权力 外部董事 风险资本 民营企业
戰略決策機製 創始人cEO權力 外部董事 風險資本 民營企業
전략결책궤제 창시인cEO권력 외부동사 풍험자본 민영기업
strategic decision-making mechanism; founder CEO power; outside directors; venture capital; private enterprises
民营企业“业绩变脸”是创业板健康良性发展的重要隐患。基于委托代理理论和资源依赖理论，从战略决策的视角探讨创业板民营企业“业绩变脸”现象形成背后的战略决策机制。利用2009年至2013年中国创业板民营企业的相关数据，通过构建2SLS模型，分析民营企业引进风险资本实施IPO后，在由创始人家族主导的战略决策机制向专业化管理主导的战略决策机制转型过程中．创始人控股股东和风险资本股东如何构建战略决策机制，进而影响公司绩效。研究结果表明。民营企业IPO后风险资本并不能有效制衡创始人控股股东，战略决策机制依旧由创始人CEO主导，并且创始人CEO追逐战略决策权力的行为会损害公司绩效、排挤风险资本股东向董事会派出外部董事；代表风险资本股东利益的外部董事并没有促进民营企业形成专业的战略决策资源供给机制和监督机制，而是在股权退出收益的激励相容情境下不断强化创始人CEO权力的主导地位，共同操纵公司股价，损害公司绩效。
民營企業“業績變臉”是創業闆健康良性髮展的重要隱患。基于委託代理理論和資源依賴理論，從戰略決策的視角探討創業闆民營企業“業績變臉”現象形成揹後的戰略決策機製。利用2009年至2013年中國創業闆民營企業的相關數據，通過構建2SLS模型，分析民營企業引進風險資本實施IPO後，在由創始人傢族主導的戰略決策機製嚮專業化管理主導的戰略決策機製轉型過程中．創始人控股股東和風險資本股東如何構建戰略決策機製，進而影響公司績效。研究結果錶明。民營企業IPO後風險資本併不能有效製衡創始人控股股東，戰略決策機製依舊由創始人CEO主導，併且創始人CEO追逐戰略決策權力的行為會損害公司績效、排擠風險資本股東嚮董事會派齣外部董事；代錶風險資本股東利益的外部董事併沒有促進民營企業形成專業的戰略決策資源供給機製和鑑督機製，而是在股權退齣收益的激勵相容情境下不斷彊化創始人CEO權力的主導地位，共同操縱公司股價，損害公司績效。
민영기업“업적변검”시창업판건강량성발전적중요은환。기우위탁대리이론화자원의뢰이론，종전략결책적시각탐토창업판민영기업“업적변검”현상형성배후적전략결책궤제。이용2009년지2013년중국창업판민영기업적상관수거，통과구건2SLS모형，분석민영기업인진풍험자본실시IPO후，재유창시인가족주도적전략결책궤제향전업화관리주도적전략결책궤제전형과정중．창시인공고고동화풍험자본고동여하구건전략결책궤제，진이영향공사적효。연구결과표명。민영기업IPO후풍험자본병불능유효제형창시인공고고동，전략결책궤제의구유창시인CEO주도，병차창시인CEO추축전략결책권력적행위회손해공사적효、배제풍험자본고동향동사회파출외부동사；대표풍험자본고동이익적외부동사병몰유촉진민영기업형성전업적전략결책자원공급궤제화감독궤제，이시재고권퇴출수익적격려상용정경하불단강화창시인CEO권력적주도지위，공동조종공사고개，손해공사적효。
The deterioration of private enterprises＇ performance is one of the important factors behind the healthy and benign de- velopment of GEM. Based on Agency Theory and Resource Dependence Theory, we take the strategic decision-making view to in- vestigate the strategic decision-making mechanism underlying the phenomena of deterioration of private enterprises＇ performance. We employ data of GEM private enterprises from 2009 to 2013 to build 2SLS model and analyze the influence of strategic deci- sion-making mechanism constructed by founder CEO and outside directors from venture capital on corporate performance in the transition process of strategic decision-making mechanism originally dominated by founder family is gradually lead by specialized management after introducing venture capital and conducting IPO. The results show that venture capital cannot prevent founder from controlling shareholders and the strategic decision-making mechanism is still dominated by the founder CEO after IPO, while founder CEO, whose power brings about damages to corporate performance, also prevents venture capital from appointing outside directors to impair his power. Instead of introducing the professional strategic decision-making mechanism of resource supplying and monitoring to private enterprises, outside directors who represent venture capital shareholders focus on stock price profits will strengthen the manipulation of founders, collude with founder CEO, and harm corporate performance.
