管理学报
管理學報
관이학보
Chinese JOurnal of Management
2014年
4期
599~604
,共null页
纵向研发联盟 成本削减 链与链竞争 利润分享
縱嚮研髮聯盟 成本削減 鏈與鏈競爭 利潤分享
종향연발련맹 성본삭감 련여련경쟁 리윤분향
vertical R＆D alliance; cost reduction; chain to chain competition; profit sharing
从博弈论的视角，构建2个强势制造商和2个排他性供应商组成的链与链价格竞争模型，研究竞争供应链基于利润分享合同的纵向研发联盟选择策略。研究表明，当市场竞争强度较低，或者市场竞争强度相对适中且研发效率较高时，形成纵向联盟结构链与链竞争均衡，该均衡为实现制造商和供应商利润Pareto改进的占优均衡。数值分析表明，随着竞争强度的减弱或者研发效率的提高，联盟的有效利润分享比例范围逐渐缩减。
從博弈論的視角，構建2箇彊勢製造商和2箇排他性供應商組成的鏈與鏈價格競爭模型，研究競爭供應鏈基于利潤分享閤同的縱嚮研髮聯盟選擇策略。研究錶明，噹市場競爭彊度較低，或者市場競爭彊度相對適中且研髮效率較高時，形成縱嚮聯盟結構鏈與鏈競爭均衡，該均衡為實現製造商和供應商利潤Pareto改進的佔優均衡。數值分析錶明，隨著競爭彊度的減弱或者研髮效率的提高，聯盟的有效利潤分享比例範圍逐漸縮減。
종박혁론적시각，구건2개강세제조상화2개배타성공응상조성적련여련개격경쟁모형，연구경쟁공응련기우리윤분향합동적종향연발련맹선택책략。연구표명，당시장경쟁강도교저，혹자시장경쟁강도상대괄중차연발효솔교고시，형성종향련맹결구련여련경쟁균형，해균형위실현제조상화공응상리윤Pareto개진적점우균형。수치분석표명，수착경쟁강도적감약혹자연발효솔적제고，련맹적유효리윤분향비례범위축점축감。
From the perspective of game theory, this paper constructs two competing supply chains, and each supply chain consists of one leader-manufacturer and one exclusive supplier. We ex- plore the selection strategy for vertical R＆D alliance with profit sharing contract. The results suggest that if market competition intensity is relatively low, or market competition intensity is moderate as well as RInD is efficient, vertical R＆D alliance chain-to-chain competition will be the dominant equi- librium, which can make suppliers and manufacturers be better off. Numerical analysis shows that the feasible range of profit sharing for alliances shrinks as the competition intensity decreases or the R＆D efficiency increases.
