CAJ | 학술논문

本文利用博弈分析工具，以广东省产业转移园为例分析了地方政府合作推动产业转移的机制与障碍。研究发现产业转移园合作双方的策略选择主要受三方面因素影响：一是双方努力水平对产业转移园的成功和官员晋升概率作用的大小；二是双方政府官员晋升效用的大小；三是双方努力成本的高低。因此，如果双方或有一方政府官员的晋升效用较小，或者双方的努力程度对产业园的发展和官员晋升概率的影响较小，则在产业转移园建设过程中就可能出现双方都不努力，或一方努力、另一方搭便车的情况，产业转移圆的发展就有可能受阻。文章还根据博弈分析的结果，在一般的意义上提出了改进政府管理体制，促进地方政府经济合作的政策建议。
본문이용박혁분석공구，이광동성산업전이완위례분석료지방정부합작추동산업전이적궤제여장애。연구발현산업전이완합작쌍방적책략선택주요수삼방면인소영향：일시쌍방노력수평대산업전이완적성공화관원진승개솔작용적대소；이시쌍방정부관원진승효용적대소；삼시쌍방노력성본적고저。인차，여과쌍방혹유일방정부관원적진승효용교소，혹자쌍방적노력정도대산업완적발전화관원진승개솔적영향교소，칙재산업전이완건설과정중취가능출현쌍방도불노력，혹일방노력、령일방탑편차적정황，산업전이원적발전취유가능수조。문장환근거박혁분석적결과，재일반적의의상제출료개진정부관리체제，촉진지방정부경제합작적정책건의。
Based on the case of industrial transfer park in Guandong province, the paper studies the coorperation mechanisms and barriers between local governments in promoting industry movement by using game analysis tools. It finds the strategy selected by partners in the constuction of industrial transfer park is mainly affected by three factors. The first is how the effort of each side affects the success probability of industrial transfer park and officials＇ promotion, the second is the utility level of promotion for officials of each party, and the third is the cost both parties have to pay for the construction of industrial transfer park. Therefore if the promotion utility of parties or one party offcials＇ is small or the joint effort has little influence on the development of industrial transfer park and the promotion probability of officials. The strategy profolio of ＂neither of parties woks hard＂ and ＂one side works hard, the other hitchhikes＂ will become equilibrium results, which possibly hinder the development of industry transfer park. According to the result of game analysis, the article also makes relevant policy recommendations in a more general sense on the change of public administration system to economic cooperation between local governments