CAJ | 학술논문

高质量的信息披露可以改善代理问题和信息不对称问题，并通过加强监督来减轻非效率投资的现象，从而提高企业投资效率。本文研究对象为深市上市公司，企业投资效率的计量是基于Richardson模型，以管理层权力的角度切入，研究了信息披露质量与企业层面投资效率间的内在关系。通过实证研究并对结果进行处理可知，高质量的信息披露可以提升企业的投资效率，不管是在投资过度还是在投资不足的样本企业中都显现。信息披露质量与投资效率之间的正相关关系在管理层权力较低的情况下愈加明显，而在投资过度的企业中，这种关系并不确定。鉴于我国上市企业多数仍属于投资不足类型，更应重视管理层权力这一因素，通过合理配置企业管理层权力，优化公司治理结构，最终改善企业的投资效率。
고질량적신식피로가이개선대리문제화신식불대칭문제，병통과가강감독래감경비효솔투자적현상，종이제고기업투자효솔。본문연구대상위심시상시공사，기업투자효솔적계량시기우Richardson모형，이관리층권력적각도절입，연구료신식피로질량여기업층면투자효솔간적내재관계。통과실증연구병대결과진행처리가지，고질량적신식피로가이제승기업적투자효솔，불관시재투자과도환시재투자불족적양본기업중도현현。신식피로질량여투자효솔지간적정상관관계재관리층권력교저적정황하유가명현，이재투자과도적기업중，저충관계병불학정。감우아국상시기업다수잉속우투자불족류형，경응중시관리층권력저일인소，통과합리배치기업관리층권력，우화공사치리결구，최종개선기업적투자효솔。
The quality of information disclosure can improve agency problems and asymmetric information problems and by strength- erring supervision to mitigate the phenomenon of non - efficiency investments, thereby enhancing the efficiency of investment. In this pa- per, companies listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange as samples, Richardson model - based measurement of investment efficiency, and from the perspecdve of power in the management of information disclosure quality and efficiency ofinvestment relationships. The empirical results show that the quality of information disclosure can enhance the efficiency of investment, whether it is still in the investment over a sample of companies in underinvestment in both apparent. Disclosure quality and efficiency of investmem in positive correlation between lower ease management authority more obvious, but in excessive investment in the enterprise, this relationship is uncertain. In view of the majority of Chlna＇s listed companies is still lack of investment types, more attention should be paid to this factor in the management authori- ty, through the rational allocation of corporate management authority, optimizing the corporate governance structure, thus improving the ef- ficiency of investment.