CAJ | 학술논문

基于公司外部治理机制和内部治理机制的角度，研究媒体监督与内部控制质量对我国A股上市公司管理层代理成本的影响，结果表明：媒体监督与内部控制质量具有降低管理层代理成本的作用；不同胜质的媒体报道对不同产权背景下企业的监督治理作用不同；同时，媒体监督与内部控制质量具有互补关系，二者的整合治理能更有效地降低管理层代理成本，保护相关者利益。
기우공사외부치리궤제화내부치리궤제적각도，연구매체감독여내부공제질량대아국A고상시공사관리층대리성본적영향，결과표명：매체감독여내부공제질량구유강저관리층대리성본적작용；불동성질적매체보도대불동산권배경하기업적감독치리작용불동；동시，매체감독여내부공제질량구유호보관계，이자적정합치리능경유효지강저관리층대리성본，보호상관자이익。
From the perspective of external and internal governance mechanisms of a company, the effect of the quality of media supervision and internal control on the agency cost of the management of China＇s listed companies is explored. Further study finds that under the background of different property rights, media reports （negative or non-negative reports） play the role of monitoring in the state-owned enterprises, but for non-state-owned enterprises, only negative media reports have this function; finally, media supervision and internal control have the complementary relationship. These conclusions mean that we should make the external and internal governance mechanisms work in concert in order to reduce the agency costs effectively and protect the stakeholders.