CAJ | 학술논문

随着女性受教育水平的提高,女性人才数量不断增加,女性人才就业及作用的发挥已成为研究热点.为探究企业招聘中政府、企业及女性人才的博弈过程,在分析政府、企业和女性人才不同策略下各自收益及成本的基础上,分别运用博弈论相关理论研究三方的博弈关系.研究结果显示,政府、企业、女性人才在三种情况下存在进化稳定策略,政府“不监管”,企业“平等对待”两性应聘者,女性人才“获得工作”是最理想的博弈结果.政府强化观念上的引导,女性人才提升自身竞争能力、维权意识及客观定位将促使企业树立公正平等的招聘理念,进而实现最理想的稳定博弈结果.
수착녀성수교육수평적제고,녀성인재수량불단증가,녀성인재취업급작용적발휘이성위연구열점.위탐구기업초빙중정부、기업급녀성인재적박혁과정,재분석정부、기업화녀성인재불동책략하각자수익급성본적기출상,분별운용박혁론상관이론연구삼방적박혁관계.연구결과현시,정부、기업、녀성인재재삼충정황하존재진화은정책략,정부“불감관”,기업“평등대대”량성응빙자,녀성인재“획득공작”시최이상적박혁결과.정부강화관념상적인도,녀성인재제승자신경쟁능력、유권의식급객관정위장촉사기업수립공정평등적초빙이념,진이실현최이상적은정박혁결과.
With the improvement of education level of women, the number of women talent is growing all the time. Women employment has become a hot research topic. In order to study the game process among government, enterprise and female talent, the paper analyses the profit and cost of governments, enterprises and female talents in different strategies and re- searches the relationship of them using related game theory. Game analysis results show that governments, enterprises and female talents in three cases exists evolutionary stable strategy. The ideal result is female talents getting jobs finally under enterprises treating male and female equally without the governments＇ guidance. Governments strengthening perception guid- ance, female talents improving comprehensive ability and right-protection awareness, positioning objectively will prompt en- terprises to establish fair and equal recruitment concept. Only in this way can we achieve the ideal outcome of game.