CAJ | 학술논문

为了提高资金的配置和使用效率，我国证券发审制度由“通道制”变为“保荐制”。“保荐制”规定保荐机构和保荐代表人共同督导上市公司，以保证其质量。但是，保荐代表人在持续督导期内的频繁变更却降低了制度的有效性。通过对保荐制度的剖析，本文发现我国保荐制度中的漏洞使得保荐代表人在面临高风险项目时能够通过变更来规避处罚。为了验证，本文以2006—2009年定向增发上市公司为样本，考察了保荐代表人变更的原因及市场反应。结果显示，当保荐项目风险越大、定增前盈余管理程度越高、保荐机构级别越低时，保荐代表人越容易变更。此外，本文发现市场对保荐代表人的变更反应消极，这很可能是因为变更向市场传递了项目质量差的负面信号。
위료제고자금적배치화사용효솔，아국증권발심제도유“통도제”변위“보천제”。“보천제”규정보천궤구화보천대표인공동독도상시공사，이보증기질량。단시，보천대표인재지속독도기내적빈번변경각강저료제도적유효성。통과대보천제도적부석，본문발현아국보천제도중적루동사득보천대표인재면림고풍험항목시능구통과변경래규피처벌。위료험증，본문이2006—2009년정향증발상시공사위양본，고찰료보천대표인변경적원인급시장반응。결과현시，당보천항목풍험월대、정증전영여관리정도월고、보천궤구급별월저시，보천대표인월용역변경。차외，본문발현시장대보천대표인적변경반응소겁，저흔가능시인위변경향시장전체료항목질량차적부면신호。
Sponsor system is the ongoing securities offering system that China uses. Sponsors play a crucial role in improving the efficiency of capital allocation of the securities market, since they are in charge of both recom- mending a company （ or a project） for securities offering and monitoring the projects post to the issuance. How- ever, the effectiveness of the sponsor system is compromised by the fact that sponsors representatives frequently leave their jobs before their works have been finished. This study examines the reasons for the turnover and the market reactions to such turnover. Our research sample consists of companies that make private placement of equity from 2006 to 2009. Our findings show that turnover among sponsor representatives increases when a） project risk is higher, b） earnings management is higher and c） institutional sponsor grade is lower. It is sur- mised that sponsor representatives leave their roles to avoid being punished. In addition, market reaction is typ- ically negative when sponsor representatives leave. This means the turnover delivers a negative signal about the projects to market.