CAJ | 학술논문

政府补贴是战略性新兴产业扶持政策的重要手段，旨在促进创新。然而，政府补贴的动机却一直倍受质疑。本文首先通过构建一个政府与企业共同参与的理论模型，以寻租效应和信息效应为基础，从官员激励视角辨别政府补贴动机是否存在扭曲，探讨政府在促进企业创新和协助企业粉饰业绩之间的权衡。随后利用战略性新兴产业254家上市公司2007～2012年的数据实证检验了政府补贴动机。结果显示，企业的创新能力和盈余管理的需求情况共同影响了企业获得政府补贴的数额；对有盈余管理需求的企业，创新支出与政府补贴有更强的相关性并且粉饰业绩需要的资金越多，政府补贴越高；企业的盈余管理需求会显著改善企业获取补贴的程度。这表明，政府在选择补贴对象和补贴程度时，兼有促进企业创新和协助企业粉饰业绩两种动机，并不是单纯偏取其一。同时，佐证了在战略性新兴产业中，促进企业创新是政府补贴政策考虑的重要因素，但也存在协助上市公司粉饰业绩问题，并未完全用在“刀刃”上。
정부보첩시전략성신흥산업부지정책적중요수단，지재촉진창신。연이，정부보첩적동궤각일직배수질의。본문수선통과구건일개정부여기업공동삼여적이론모형，이심조효응화신식효응위기출，종관원격려시각변별정부보첩동궤시부존재뉴곡，탐토정부재촉진기업창신화협조기업분식업적지간적권형。수후이용전략성신흥산업254가상시공사2007～2012년적수거실증검험료정부보첩동궤。결과현시，기업적창신능력화영여관리적수구정황공동영향료기업획득정부보첩적수액；대유영여관리수구적기업，창신지출여정부보첩유경강적상관성병차분식업적수요적자금월다，정부보첩월고；기업적영여관리수구회현저개선기업획취보첩적정도。저표명，정부재선택보첩대상화보첩정도시，겸유촉진기업창신화협조기업분식업적량충동궤，병불시단순편취기일。동시，좌증료재전략성신흥산업중，촉진기업창신시정부보첩정책고필적중요인소，단야존재협조상시공사분식업적문제，병미완전용재“도인”상。
It＇ s the important strategy for China to step up efforts to develop strategic emerging industry. Since the State Council issued the ＂Decision of the State Council on Accelerating Fostering and Developing Emerging In- dustries of Strategic Importance＂ in October 2010, Government has given more subsidies to strategic emerging in- dustries designed to promote innovation. Given the complexity of the technology, uncertainty, the high of spillover effects and the insufficient of market demand in Strategic emerging industries, without government intervention, the enterprises are not willing to carry out R＆D. Government subsidy~ Therefore the subsidy is reasonable in a sense. may encourage enterprises＇ innovation by way of R＆D Government subsidies should be used to promote technological innovation, transformation and upgrading, re- search and development, market development and brand construction and so on. These are used at the key point~ However,in a recent discussion, according to media reports, government subsidies have become an important means to plaster the performance of listed companies known as window dressing. Government subsidies are used to promote enterprise innovation,or to help enterprises plaster the performance？ This paper intends to shed light on whether Government subsidies are used at the key point from the perspec- tive of official encourage~ From the government＇ s perspective to identify the existence of distorting government sub- sidies motive has its benefits ： as long as firms get the subsidies, subsidies are the part of profits, whether intentional- ly or unintentionally, must dress up performance, so it＇ s difficult to distinguish whether the subsidies are used to promote innovation or to whitewash results intentionally from firms＇ perspective~ But, we can get a better identifica- tion from the problem that whether the firms which loss or decline in performance get the government ＂special care＂ ~ Earnings management in China is not simply a management choice, but involves collusive manipulation by local governments. Learned from Jia et al. （2013）who found complementary roles of connections and performance in Po- litical Selection in China, a theoretical model are established for studying the true intention of the government to subsidy the firms. The theoretical model includes government and firm. Because government subsidies paid by the State or local levels of government, companies can＇ t decide, the local government decided the subsidy object and companies passively demonstrate whether they plaster their performance or foster innovation. And it＇ s based on the assumptions ： when the firm needs to plaster the performance, （ 1 ） the government has more opportunity to seek rent （2） the firm will likely speak the truth about its capability~ As a result, we find that government subsidies have two motives at the same time, not purely to promote innovation or cosmetic results. Then, according to the data of strategic emerging enterprises from 2007 to 2012 ,We first explain how our sam- ple is selected and then explain how we use the data to measure innovation and window dressing. Then, this paper analyzes the relationship between the opportunity that enterprises get subsidy and its performance. We find that （ 1 ） the more R＆D investment, the more Government subsidy received. What＇ s more, （2） for enterprises which need to cosmetic results, R＆D investment and Government subsidy have stronger correlation and （3）the more funds needed to cosmetic results, the more Government subsidy received. This conclusion of this paper is relatively straightforward. The two motives of the government subsidies for stra- tegic emerging industries to promote innovation or to cosmetic results may interact, not simply to whitewash per- formance or to foster innovation individually, an aspect ignored in the previous literature. On the one hand, despite the possibility of rent-seeking, but the promotion of innovative features still exist; on the other hand, government subsidies intended to foster innovation, but in fact the use of cosmetic results are also an objective reality, not all used at the key point. Auxiliary evidence suggests that the government subsidies in strategic emerging industry are not used at the key point completely. Clarifying the mechanism of interaction between them is the foundation of a- chieving more for government subsidies.