经济研究
經濟研究
경제연구
Economic Research Journal
2014年
4期
116~129
,共null页
上游垄断 产品质量升级 政府保护
上遊壟斷 產品質量升級 政府保護
상유롱단 산품질량승급 정부보호
Upstream Monopoly; Quality Upgrading; Government Subsidy
本文首先构建理论模型阐述了上游垄断影响企业产品质量选择的作用渠道,并澄清了其阻碍产品质量升级的条件。在此基础上,克服了以“价格法”衡量产品质量的局限性,结合《中国海关贸易数据库》和《中国工业企业数据库》,采用“回归反推方法”对中国企业的产品质量进行了测算。研究发现,上游垄断对产品质量升级的作用取决于垄断的成因以及下游的竞争程度:由政府保护所形成的垄断明显不利于产品质量升级;由企业自身的高效率所导致的垄断对下游产品质量升级的作用与下游竞争程度有关,下游竞争程度越高,则其正面作用越小。随着下游行业竞争的放开,其负面作用正在逐步凸显。
本文首先構建理論模型闡述瞭上遊壟斷影響企業產品質量選擇的作用渠道,併澄清瞭其阻礙產品質量升級的條件。在此基礎上,剋服瞭以“價格法”衡量產品質量的跼限性,結閤《中國海關貿易數據庫》和《中國工業企業數據庫》,採用“迴歸反推方法”對中國企業的產品質量進行瞭測算。研究髮現,上遊壟斷對產品質量升級的作用取決于壟斷的成因以及下遊的競爭程度:由政府保護所形成的壟斷明顯不利于產品質量升級;由企業自身的高效率所導緻的壟斷對下遊產品質量升級的作用與下遊競爭程度有關,下遊競爭程度越高,則其正麵作用越小。隨著下遊行業競爭的放開,其負麵作用正在逐步凸顯。
본문수선구건이론모형천술료상유롱단영향기업산품질량선택적작용거도,병징청료기조애산품질량승급적조건。재차기출상,극복료이“개격법”형양산품질량적국한성,결합《중국해관무역수거고》화《중국공업기업수거고》,채용“회귀반추방법”대중국기업적산품질량진행료측산。연구발현,상유롱단대산품질량승급적작용취결우롱단적성인이급하유적경쟁정도:유정부보호소형성적롱단명현불리우산품질량승급;유기업자신적고효솔소도치적롱단대하유산품질량승급적작용여하유경쟁정도유관,하유경쟁정도월고,칙기정면작용월소。수착하유행업경쟁적방개,기부면작용정재축보철현。
This paper builds a model to investigate the impact of upstream monopoly on downward firm's quality choice, giving the condition under which upstream monopoly blocks quality upgrading. We then empirically examine the impact of upstream monopoly on firms' quality upgrading. Instead of using the unit value method of measuring product quality, this paper combines the Chinese industrial firm data and Chinese custom data, and uses the regression method to compute the firms' product quality. The results show that: First, higher upstream monopoly is on average associated with higher product quality. Second, the impact of upstream monopoly is heterogeneous across firms and industries, government subsidized monopoly has a negative effect on downstream product quality, and the negative effect is more pronounced for industries with larger extent of downstream competition.